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Abstract  
This research examines the impact of Chinese investment in resource-rich economies in 
Africa. In order to deal with this issue, I have selected Zambia and Nigeria because they 
provide a platform methodologically for comparison and evaluation on how China is 
engaging with resource-rich countries. Zambia and Nigeria have become increasingly 
important to China. Zambia’s copper and Nigeria’s oil reserves are some of the vital 
resources that are scarce and economically significant toward China’s global economic 
ambitions. Similarly both these African countries offer China a market for their 
manufacturing goods, on the other hand, Zambia and Nigeria have benefited from capital 
inflow, political stature, infrastructure development, an alternative trade partner, human 
development and security assistance. China’s manufacturing capacity has gained considerable 
shares in most markets globally, moreover in developing markets by providing low-income 
consumers with affordable goods, although concerns over their quality is still a major 
problem. Since becoming a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, the 
Asian giant has the greatest number of anti-dumping cases globally, with the largest cases 
from many African countries. I employ manufacturing as a case study, as it is an effective 
contributor towards industrial and economic transformation. It boosts technological skills, 
promotes entrepreneurial activities, and enables entrepreneurs to participate in the global 
market. However, the influx of Chinese manufactured goods in Zambia and Nigeria has 
shown to be detrimental towards industrial transformation and competitiveness by crowding 
out non-Chinese goods, discouraging entrepreneurial activities and strain intra-continental 
trade. This research has found that Chinese investment has deterred significant economic 
growth; it further made these economies more resource-reliant, weakened institutions, 
strengthened political patronage, heightened corruption in resource deals and undermined 
local manufacturing by crippling local businesses and further strain intra-African trade. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1 Thesis statement and rational  
China is currently the second largest economy in the world, making its mark as a powerful 
non-democratic, non-western country. Sino-African relations have drawn global attention 
with different viewpoints as to whether China’s activities on the continent are encouraging or 
deterring development. Traditionally, Africa was perceived as a dark continent with 
unfavourable economies due to political instability, and unfavourable conditions for foreign 
investment. However, Africa’s image is changing as it becomes more receptive to the 
liberalisation of its economies. Critics such as James Okoro, Richard Ingwe and Mathew 
Ojong (2011: 94) argue that China’s heavy presence in Africa; especially in resource-rich 
countries have deterred development due to imbalance trade patterns, a market to export their 
manufactured goods, their unconditional support for rogue regimes that heightens corruption, 
and a relationship that lacks transparency. They further hold the view that China is interested 
in the exploiting Africa’s natural resources, thereby increasing Africa’s dependency on 
resource revenues rather than economic diversification for sustainable growth. On the other 
hand, supporters of Sino-African relations have welcomed Chinese investments, and also 
collaborated the construction of roads, hospitals, water systems, schools, power stations and 
major public infrastructure project such as the coastal railway in Nigeria worth US$12 billion 
(Adebajo, 2010: 165). 
 
The main goal of this study is to evaluate the impacts of China’s investment in Africa, 
specifically focusing on the extraction of Nigerian oil and Zambian copper in the past two 
decades. This period reflects the rapid increase of Chinese investments and the cancellation 
of debts to various African countries. Overall trade statistics between China and Africa 
reached US$10.9 billion in 2000, then hit US$91 billion in 2009 before increasing to US$300 
billion in 2015 (Haggai, 2016: 54). Some studies suggest that China’s approach resembles 
neo-imperialistic characteristics. China is not the only superpower involved in the “new 
scramble of Africa”, but much attention is on the Asian giant. Significant criticism on 
China’s presence in Africa comes from the West, although there are African observers who 
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are also sceptical of Chinese engagement with various African countries. This study aims to 
delve into aspects beyond this narrative and to explore China’s footprint and influence in 
Africa. It is for that reason that the study investigates the impacts of Chinese investment in 
resource-rich economies and to which extent it has been detrimental towards Nigeria and 
Zambia’s development. 
 
1.2 Research questions  
Primary question 
 What are the impacts of China’s investment in resource-rich economies in Africa?  
Many African countries are resource-rich and have been so for a long time. Jumanne and 
Keong (2018: 18) explain natural resources as resources existing in the natural environment 
that are both scare and economically useful in production and consumption. Non-renewable 
resources such as copper, oil, gas, metal, the 3Ts (tantalum, tin and tungsten) and gold have 
been crucial in the development of Western and Eastern economies. China has invested 
billions worth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in various resource-rich countries such as 
Angola, Sudan, D.R Congo, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria and Chad (Gamache et. al 2013). I am 
interested in investigating the effects of Chinese FDI in Nigeria and Zambia, and the 
evolution of their economic relationship since the establishment of these relations with China. 
I will map out the key dimensions of Sino-African relations and provide detailed accounts of 
the scope of Chinese investment and economic policies that have shaped these relations. 
 
Secondary questions  
 Does Chinese investment have the same implications in Zambia and in Nigeria? 
 Does China’s economic and political approach in Africa resemble that of neo-
imperialism? 
 How have China’s political relations changed over time and influence in economic 
policies? 
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China’s economic growth and decline have a direct effect on economies, including 
commodity prices. Zambia’s and Nigeria’s economies are negatively affected should China’s 
economy experiences a slow-down due to their reliance on Chinese investments. 
Furthermore, China’s influence in many African countries, moreover resource-rich countries, 
has altered foreign policies of these African countries towards the U.S and E.U. Unlike the 
U.S and E.U., China does not have set conditions when providing capital to these countries. 
However, the implications of China’s engagement with Zambia and Nigeria have resulted in 
many challenges such as social tensions between mine workers and Chinese mine owners in 
Zambia and increased violence and the abduction Chinese nationals in the Niger Delta.    
 
The debate that China is exploiting resource-rich countries in Africa by cheaply extracting 
natural resources and importing their manufactured goods is a concern for the West. Oil 
extraction in Nigeria and copper mining in Zambia will serve as a base for unpacking these 
issues of whether China resembles neo-imperialistic characteristics. Key dimensions of what 
imperialism is will be used in order to determine if China inhibits neo-imperialist 
characteristics. Secondly, the research will look at the impact of Chinese manufactured goods 
on local industries, specifically assessing how the influx of Chinese manufactured goods have 
crowded out non-Chinese goods, crippled local production, discouraged entrepreneurial 
activity and innovation, and exacerbated the smuggling of counterfeit goods.  
 
China is an authoritarian country – with strong evidence of a powerful and strong central 
power and limited political power. In addition, it claims to have strong stands on a non-
interference foreign policy – which has been the reason it is attractive to other authoritarian 
regimes. In that regard, China is seen as a state that legitimises human rights abuses, does not 
encourage rule of law in other countries or democratisation, accountability and to potentially 
create authoritarian stagnation in other cases (Thakur, 2009: 18). However, the concept of 
non-interference has not always proven to be effective. In the past, China has supported many 
African countries during the period of decolonisation by providing aid and investment to 
countries under conditions of not recognising Taiwan. In recent years China has meddled in 
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Zambia’s 2006 and 2011 elections. Furthermore, they have heavily invested in authoritarian 
countries, including war-torn countries. Adebajo (2010: 168) contends that China became 
40% of the largest investor and importer of oil in Sudan, which perpetuated human rights 
violations in South Sudan and Durfar. I will be assessing China’s power dynamics and these 
countries responses to the Asian giant’s influence in their state affairs. 
 
1.3 Methodology  
I will employ comparative research design due to its relevance in generating a hypothesis, in-
depth insights, and exploring phenomena (Lor, 2011: 12). As explained by Shell (1992: 3), 
the use of case studies is imperative when “investigating a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context”. These case studies will be exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. 
However, the literature review will use few case studies in order to determine if there is a 
replication of a single type of incident, as well as to make comparisons or contrasting factors 
in those countries. In this case, I am interested in China’s foreign policies and its trade 
patterns in resource-rich countries in Africa, as securing these scarce and valuable resources 
are imperative towards China’s economic ambition.  
 
I am interested in China’s relationship with African countries, more specifically countries 
with resource profiles. In order to deal with that issue, I have selected Zambia and Nigeria 
because they provide a platform methodologically for comparison and evaluation on how 
China is engaging with resource-rich countries. Both countries were British colonies and 
turned to China as an alternative political and economic partner. Like Nigeria, Zambia is 
dependent on resource revenues which have resulted in mono-economies. Both countries are 
in constant need of investments, hence, China’s heavy presence in these countries. This has 
also caused a resource curse as they have plentiful resources but cannot produce sustainable 
economic progress. The resource curse in Nigeria, for instance, has heightened corruption in 
government, oil deals and international agents. In the case of Zambia, social tensions have 
erupted in mining areas were Chinese investments are prominent.  
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Unlike Zambia, Nigeria offers a unique benefit due to its geographic location in West Africa, 
as well as its large population. China’s manufactured goods are effortlessly transported to the 
country, and Chinese traders and locals sell them across the country, while some are 
transported to neighbouring countries. In Zambia’s case, the increasing emergence of Chinese 
migrant entrepreneurs has encouraged business opportunities for Chinese people, an impact 
Nigeria seemed to have avoided in a sense that we do not see the extreme increase of Chinese 
migrant entrepreneurs. In 2012, Zambia was amongst the 10 fastest growing economies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and reaching a lower middle-income country status (Haggai, 2016: 09). 
Furthermore, Zambia has agricultural potential; an important factor China will explore, as 
they address their anxiety for food security in the future. 
 
I will further employ manufacturing as a case study in the last chapter. Manufacturing is an 
effective contributor towards industrial and economic transformation. It boosts technological 
skills, promotes entrepreneurial activities, and enables people to participate in the global 
market. However, Chinese investment is heavily concentrated in natural resources and less in 
the local manufacturing sector. In addition, China’s production capacity is taking over 
superpowers such as the E.U and the U.S., proving to be a major concern for production 
capacity not only in Nigeria and in Zambia but also globally. By using this as a case study, I 
want to evaluate the long-term effects China’s production capacity will have on 
manufacturing in these countries.  
 
The research methodology will predominantly be desktop using a qualitative approach, 
relying on primary and secondary sources. This approach is effective in explaining social 
norms, socioeconomic status, phenomena and behaviours that are not apparent (Hancock et. 
al, 2009). Therefore, the information will be interpreted and will form a critical analysis 
towards my research findings. I did not choose quantitative methodology because it is aimed 
at measuring something and I argue that it will not be appropriate for this study. In terms of 
ethics, my research will not require any interviews or field research. The limitation of my 
research is that my sources are English-based thus I unable to review literature written in 
Mandarin, which I believe will have added value and perhaps provided a different perspective 
on the topic.    
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1.4 Chapter structure   
Chapter two will discuss the evolution of the Sino-African relations – including the 
challenges and opportunities of these relations. The chapter will also evaluate how natural 
resources created a geo-economical competition between different economic powers such as 
the E.U, U.S, and China which is often referred to as the “new scramble of Africa” inspired 
by the ’Africa Rising’ narrative. In addition, it also discusses how Western perceptions of 
China has continued to drive the negative narrative of China’s motives in Africa as well as its 
foreign policy practices. This is due to the fear that Western hegemony may not be 
guaranteed in the future, should China become more influential in Africa. It will also focus 
on the theory of a resource curse and its effects. In addition, it will explore arguments of 
imperialism and China’s neo-imperialistic characteristics.  
 
The dynamics of Sino-Zambian relations has contributed to Zambia’s reliance towards 
copper sales as the main source of the country’s revenue, resulting in an undiversified 
economy. Chapter three will present a historical background of mining in Zambia; from 
failed nationalisation to privatisation. Due to the enormous Chinese investment in copper 
sales the principal argument of this chapter is that Chinese political influence has exacerbated 
social tensions between locals and the Chinese people. This chapter further shows that 
Chinese private firms have been under the spotlight regarding issues of labour disputes that 
have led to violent clashes and the death of Zambian miners in the hands of their Chinese 
employers, environmental damage, as well as the lack of corporate social responsibility. An 
evaluation of Chinese non-interference policy is tested when an anti-China presidential 
candidate ran for the 2006 and 2011 Presidential elections. 
 
In the fourth chapter, a historical background of the dynamics of China and Nigeria provides 
insights into both the economic and political aspects of their relations over the past four 
decades. I focus on the extraction of oil, as this resource is the frontline of internal and 
external agents battling for it, which has contributed towards various challenges including the 
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emergence of insurgent agents such as Boko Haram and MEND (the Movement for 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta). Furthermore, it highlights Chinese billions worth of 
investment in the oil industry, particularly after 2004 with the introduction of “Oil for 
Infrastructure” by the Nigerian government. Due to Nigeria’s constant battle with security, a 
series of coups, coupled with violent ethnic and religious rivalry, the chapter evaluates how 
these issues shaped Nigeria’s foreign policy and more importantly how Chinese navigated 
through these challenges towards their resource interest. The principal argument of this 
chapter is that neopatrimonialism, corruption, malgovernance, and well positioned political 
insiders exercising ’agency’ by embezzling oil revenues, has caused a negative impact on 
Nigeria’s national interest.  
 
China’s production capacity of manufactured goods globally is increasingly a concern 
amongst the E.U and the West.  Chapter five, compares the Asian giant with Africa’s 
traditional trade partners on business practices, moreover on issues of dumping. I focused on 
this because; China is often under fire for their imbalance trade patterns due to influx import 
of their manufactured goods. The principal argument of the chapter is that Chinese 
manufactured goods and emergence of Chinese economic migrants have contributed to 
Nigeria and Zambia’s lack of industrial and economic transformation by undermining local 
production and entrepreneurial activities in various sectors. I also focus on how the influx of 
Chinese manufactured goods has created a grey area for informal trade and the unprecedented 
sales of counterfeits goods that has caused billions in tax revenues.  
 
China’s capital is useful and necessary for Africa but the main argument of this thesis is that 
consequences of the Sino-African relations have negatively affected economic growth, 
quality of institutions, the perpetuation of authoritarian governments such as Nigeria and 
Zambia. Over the course of the thesis, I will evaluate the following; China’s investment in 
resource-rich countries, as natural resources are central to the expansion of Chinese global 
economic ambitions, the continuous imbalance of trade, unprecedented influx of 
manufactured goods which are undercutting non-resource sectors, the strong presence of 
Chinese entrepreneurs in Zambia and China’s political influence in these countries which 
often involves evident state collusion with Chinese companies and state capture. 
13 
 
Chapter 2: Theorising China in Africa 
 
2.1 Introduction  
China’s engagement in Africa made an undeniable contribution towards growth in many 
developing economies. African countries such as Ethiopia, Tanzania, Algeria, Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Angola, and South Africa have benefited from the much-needed infrastructure, a 
developmental partner, capital inflow, and a powerful ally and moved away from the West as 
the main trade partner. However, through all these engagements with China, issues of 
political patronage, heightened corruption, imbalanced trade deals and the lack of 
transparency have negatively affected the Sino-African relations and a missed opportunity of 
sustainable growth for African countries.  
 
This chapter aims to demonstrate challenges and opportunities of the Sino-African relations 
and argue that the consequences of these relations have negatively affected economic growth 
and quality of institutions, and the perpetuation of human rights abuses such as in Sudan. The 
first section will discuss what makes resources-rich economies attractive to foreign actors and 
how these resources have contributed to a resource curse. In addition, the section will also 
assess the effects on these economies and their foreign policy with foreign investors. The 
second section will discuss the dynamics of the Sino-African relations and scope of Chinese 
investment in various resource-rich countries. Thereafter it will explore arguments of 
imperialism and China’s neo-imperialistic characteristics.  
 
2.2 Africa: Resource-rich and cursed  
In recent years, former imperial powers and new foreign investors are “flooding” back into 
the continent, mainly because of “Africa Rising’’. The emergence of “Africa Rising” 
encouraged foreign investors to do business on the continent and further encouraged Western 
governments to open more trade opportunities rather than provide aid. According to an article 
by The Economist published December 3rd, 2011, the commodities boom played an important 
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factor, benefiting a quarter of Africa’s growth, with higher revenues generated from natural 
resources from 2000 – 2008.  The article confirms that foreign investment helped improve the 
development of many African but countries such as D.R Congo, Rwanda and Ethiopia have 
become politically noxious, while others such as South Africa were left tainted with 
corruption coupled with many other challenges.  
 
“Africa Rising” is a narrative used to highlight positive aspects of the African continent. 
Firstly, it claims that there is a fast-growing middle class; arguing that over 60 million people 
have an income of US$3,000 per year. Secondly, there are growing economies coupled with 
decent governments (The Economist: 2011). The United Nations (UN) (2016: 16) states that 
between 1989 and 2003, the number of democracies in Africa increased from 3 to 23. 
Thirdly, the emergence of technology and innovation is boosting growth; there are 600 
million mobile users, further promoting mobile banking and telephonic agro-info, farmers 
marketing their crops, and participation of people in social and political life. Fourthly, 
China’s arrival has improved Africa’s infrastructure and more non-Western investors such as 
Brazil, India, Turkey and Malaysia are following China’s lead (The Economist: 2011). 
Lastly, from 2002 to 2011 the level of violent conflicts dropped from 55% to 24%, especially 
West Africa and the Great Lakes regions (UN: 2016: 16).  
 
A critic of the “Africa Rising” narrative Wadongo (2014) proposes that there needs to be a 
realistic view towards this narrative due to the fact that the so-called growing middle-class 
people are still living in poverty. For instance, the African Development Banks terms a 
middle-class person in Africa as one who spends between US$2 and US$20 a day. In the case 
of Kenya, 93% of households of 42 million people in that country have a monthly income of 
under US$450. In 2010, the World Bank said around half of the population of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) lived on the equivalent of less than US$1.25 a day (Carmody, 2011: 02). In 
essence, there is a contrast of what a middle-class person is in Africa compared to one in the 
U.S. The benefits of a middle-class person in the U.S consists of accessing and affording 
decent education, financial opportunities, a decent house and job, good health care facilities 
and more, however, those are not the same benefits we see within the so-called middle-class 
people in Africa. Therefore, the need to adopt effective policies to improve African lives is 
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imperative. I echo Machirori’s (2015) argument that “Africa Rising” is currently a gateway 
for Western and Eastern powers to benefit from the exploitation of oil and gas reserves as 
well as to benefit from the booming telecommunications industry and infrastructure 
development to transport these natural resources back to the West and East. Despite this 
narrative and growth rates of more than 6% revenues end up in the pockets of government 
officials, investors, shareholders while wealth gap is rising in an alarming rate in Africa 
(Machirori: 2015). 
 
Furthermore, Machirori (2015) affirms that the 2013 – 2016 West Africa Ebola outbreak - 
which claimed 11,300 lives mostly in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, undermined the 
narrative of “Africa Rising”. These countries were unable to provide medication and 
emergency health care for people infected and affected by the virus disease. In addition, it 
showed the reality of people still living in dire conditions, eating fruit bats and bush meat of 
which are unclean, diseased and dangerous. I argue that Africa’s inability to address Ebola 
with the abundance of human resources and natural resources means that “Africa Rising” is a 
“sales pitch” for Western and Eastern economic powers to exploit resources and contribute 
little towards inclusive growth, the creation of jobs, and poverty reduction in this resource-
rich African countries. 
 
The abundance of natural resources incites the concept of the “new scramble of Africa”. 
Foreign and internal investors within the continent are strategically exploiting natural 
resources and the telecommunication industry. These strategies include soft power game by 
using economic and humanitarian aid, interest-free loans, preferential trade agreements, and 
investment in infrastructure compared to the previous scramble of Africa that consisted of 
strong-arm tactics (Al Jazeera, 2014). 
 
Natural resources are resources that exist in the natural environment that are both scarce and 
economically useful in production or consumption. Typically, renewable resources are land, 
water, fish and forestry, while non-renewable resources are minerals such as oil, gas, and 
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other raw materials. Non-renewable resources are often the drivers of attracting FDI in 
Africa, and vital for industrialisation economic expansion for the West and East (Jumanne 
and Keong, 2018: 18). For instance, the 3Ts (tantalum, tin and tungsten) & gold are valuable 
minerals for the manufacturing of everyday products such as phones, iPhones, refrigerators, 
jewellery, aeroplane components, automobile (Cuvelier et.al, 2014: 1). 
  
According to Tsing (2005: 51), what makes natural resources natural is that they have to be 
transformed by all kinds of human intervention, from the extraction stage to the systematic 
process of making it usable and valuable. For instance, coal is just a lump of coal when 
extracted from the earth, and it goes through various processes of being transported to a 
warehouse, sorted, graded to meet different specifications and then transformed into burnable 
coal. Secondly, the negotiations by people who extracted the lump of coal to the burnable 
coal contribute towards its value and the creation of demand. Furthermore, Tsing (2005: 51) 
emphasises that resources should be prepared carefully to make them “natural” and ready for 
consumption.  Like rough diamonds extracted and transformed into polished finished 
“natural” diamonds.  
 
The African continent is an example of a resource-rich continent, however, economically 
poor. Hence, competing foreign investors are particularly investing heavily in the mining 
sector. Carmody (2011: 02) contends that the resource-rich continent contains 42% of the 
world’s bauxite, 38% of its uranium, 42% of its gold, 73% of its platinum, 88% of its 
diamonds and around 10% of its oil. Natural resources offer the beginning of a value chain in 
advancing economies, especially industrial economies. Therefore, the West and the East 
depend on an affordable supply of natural resources in order to maintain their fundamental 
role of a high capacity in the production of exports of various manufactured goods. 
 
Despite the continents rich resources, it suffers from a resource curse. Although the existence 
of a resource curse is not sufficiently proven, convincing arguments on the subject exist. 
While there is no best measure, empirical and casual observation provides information on the 
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subject. Ross (2015: 240) explains a resource curse as resources that negatively affect a 
country’s political stability, quality of institutions, and economic growth. Furthermore, the 
resource curse enriches the government; leads to a mono-economy, triggers violence, the 
government is less accountable to its citizens and is less democratic. Resources such as 
petroleum, alluvial diamonds & gemstones, other non-fuel minerals, and coca leaves can 
contribute to the curse. Many African countries have been resource-rich for a long time but 
have not gained sustainable economic growth compared to countries with fewer resources or 
no resources altogether. Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Zambia are 
examples countries suffering from a resource curse (Sachs and Warner, 2001: 829).  
 
Bashwira et.al (2014:109) explains that the mining of the 3Ts in the D.R Congo has led to 
horrific violence; armed groups are accused of committing severe human rights violation 
such as modern-day slavery, forced labour and sexual violence. In addition, rape is often used 
as a weapon of war in the area of Kivu. An estimated 5.4million people have died and 
1.7million displaced due to mineral conflict-related deaths between August 1998 to April 
2007 (Enough Project: 2016). Furthermore, the illegal extraction of these minerals has a 
direct link to corruption amongst politicians involved in the mining industry, Multinational 
Corporation (MNCs), and armed groups. In 2008, these minerals generated US$185million 
for armed groups (Enough Project: 2016).  
 
In the last decade, studies on the resource curse found that, under certain conditions, oil 
attributes to a “political resource curse” more especially amongst African countries. Ross 
(2015: 246) contends that oil, in particular, has three negative effects on a country. Firstly, 
authoritarian regimes become more durable and prolong their survival in office; secondly, 
there is more corruption and thirdly it triggers violent conflicts in low and middle-income 
countries, i.e. the Niger Delta (Jackson, 2007: 588). Oil rents assist authoritarian leaders to 
remain in office and they do this by spending more money on the military to keep it loyal as a 
preventative measure to suppress possibilities of an uprising, as well as media freedom. Sachs 
and Warner (2001: 828) confirm that oil-rich countries such as Nigeria have not experienced 
sustained rapid economic growth because it tends to render the export industry 
uncompetitive.  
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On the other hand, Watts (2013: 1017) remarks that oil alone does not contribute to the 
political dysfunction of a country, but in fact, the curse manifests because of people 
controlling it. He holds the view that oil by itself cannot produce all these effects but instead 
oil is surrounded by these specific sets of political, economic, social relationships, networks, 
and circumstances. He is critical of oil having what he calls an “Olympian power”. Oil does 
not have a life of its own; it has been given life through the networks and processes of human 
beings. However, not all oil exporting countries look like Nigeria and alike. For instance, 
both Nigeria and the U.S produce oil and both have different political and economic 
outcomes; the U.S did not necessarily experience a resource curse. The U.S has economic 
diversity, have strong institutions, they do not rely on oil exports but rather consumes all its 
oil domestically. Jackson’s (2007: 592) study further highlights that the discovery of oil in 
the Niger Delta continues to have a harmful impact towards stability and nation-building. The 
Niger Delta crisis has worsened over time due to sophisticated organised criminal activity, 
encouragement of international criminal networks and display of deep-rooted corruption in 
the procurement and marketing of oil and gas.  
 
Location of oil can also exacerbate conflict in oil-rich areas. Ross (2013: 251) found that 
when oil is offshore it does not pose the same effect on a country’s conflict risk, whereas oil 
located onshore can have a devastating effect. This is even more consequential when it is 
found in a region populated by marginalised ethnic groups, or a region with a highly 
concentrated ethnic group, or poor regions relative to the national average.  
 
2.3 Sino-African relations and neo-imperialism 
China’s political and economic relations with African countries have a long-standing history 
from the period of decolonisation and independence in the 1950s and 1960s. China used this 
period to strengthen their relationship with African countries, more especially resource-rich 
countries (Harper: 2017), such as Algeria, Egypt, Somalia, Tanzania and D.R Congo 
(previously Zaire) were some of the countries that received the lion’s share of Chinese 
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assistance (Adebajo, 2010: 165), by presenting itself as an alternative developmental partner, 
rather than previous imperialist empires. The majority of African leaders viewed this as an 
opportunity to liberate African economies, and secure substantial physical infrastructure, 
which was a crucial development area for the continent (Harper: 2017). 
 
Chinese aid and financial investments contributed to Africa’s economic development, with 
notable successful infrastructure projects such as the Tazara railway, which handles 
exports/imports for Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, DR Congo, South Africa, Zimbabwe as well 
as China. The project cost over US$600 million and took five years to build, and was finished 
two years ahead of schedule in 1975. Although the project was first envisioned by Cecil 
Rhodes in the late nineteenth century, British colonists reconsidered it years later. The project 
ceased to exist when it was rejected as an unfeasible project by a World Bank mission and the 
United Nations until China, Tanzania and Zambia signed off on the project in 1967. From the 
literature, it is evident that the success of the project marked as an iconic symbol of China’s 
commitment to Africa as well as an ideologically inspired engagement of anti-imperialist 
solidarity and possibly unchain their control or dependency from previous colonial powers 
(Power et al. 2012: 48).  
 
Similarly, in early in the 60s and 70s China assisted with aid that focused on light industries 
for countries such as Guinea, Benin, Mali, Somalia and Tanzania to manufacture cigarettes 
from their own tobacco, which were popular with the locals (Brautigam, 2009:195). In total, 
China contributed US$2.5billion to 36 African countries between the mid-1950s to mid-
1970s. Between the 1980s and 1990s, the Asian giant provided more aid in efforts to 
rehabilitate former aid projects of which have previously collapsed or weakened and began to 
cement sustainable developmental benefits in African countries. (Power et al. 2012: 51). 
African countries sought political stature, investment, trade, human development and security 
assistance, and infrastructure from China, whereas, China sought key natural resources, a 
market for Chinese manufactured goods, political legitimacy, and prosperity. Here, political 
legitimacy refers to China’s need for legitimacy in the international platform (Hanauer et.al, 
2014: 5). 
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China is not a new player in Africa, but rather it increased political and economic interests in 
recent years as part of the “new scramble for Africa”. It also created competition amongst 
different economic powers for resource exploitation, a market for foreign manufactured 
goods and most importantly to become exceptionally influential with different resource-rich 
countries in Africa (Alden and Alves, 2009: 5-6). Interestingly, authors Edinger and Pistorius 
(2011: 502) argue that Africa's trade with China is not different from other trading partners in 
the West. According to 2010 findings, over 93% of Africa's exports to China were metals, 
minerals, and petroleum products, which was similar trading deal with the U.S. 
 
Unable to meet its annual copper, nickel, zinc and other raw minerals; China has become an 
important trading partner for many African countries and engaged in various resource 
extraction projects within Africa. China imported over US$100 billion worth of base metals 
every year since 2009. In 2003, it passed the U.S as the world’s largest copper consumer 
(Executive Research Associates, 2009: 45). Following this, many argue that China’s 
engagement with African countries resemble forms of neo-imperialism by taking advantage 
of Africa’s resources.  
 
Chinese direct investment in Africa has led to the fast economic growth as well as the 
reduction of poverty in many African countries. By the year 2000, China had assumed the 
role of being Africa’s largest trading partner. The per capita growth rate of the average 
African economy rose from 0.6% per annum in the 1990s to 2.8% in the 2000s. Meanwhile, 
many African rulers received China with open arms.  African countries willing to do business 
with the Chinese strengthened some of their institutions and macroeconomic policies (Chen 
et al. 2015: 2). On the other hand, Sino-African relations showed that there is an 
overwhelmingly positive perception of China’s political and economic involvement within 
Africa by Africans.  According to a 2015 survey conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes, 
70% Africans were in favour of China, unlike in other regions such as 41% in Europe, 57% 
in Asia, or Latin America (Chen et al. 2015: 2). 
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I argue that China’s presence in Africa is a concern for mostly Western powers due to 
China’s influence on the continent. China is a threat moreover when they invest in rogue 
countries such as Zimbabwe, and Sudan because they have the potential of undermining 
international standards of democracy, economic liberalisation and other challenges. Most 
importantly, many African countries are comfortable embracing China’s businesses and other 
opportunities. The West fears that it will no longer have a dominant-influence on African 
matters, which also means less influence on the types and resource deals they may agree on 
in the future. The more influence and powerful China becomes, the more attractive it 
becomes in global affairs as a non-democratic, non-western country – which is a very 
important factor. China does not go by the normal standards of doing business and it could be 
very detrimental to Western powers, especially economically. Hirono and Suzuki (2014: 445) 
contend that the rise of China could mean Western hegemony may not be guaranteed in the 
future.  
 
Between 1961 and 2006 saw a period were China and Africa embraced exchange 
programmes, such as sending 2,000 students from 48 African countries to study in China. 
While 15,000 Chinese technical experts were sent to Africa for various projects ranging from 
growing rice and building factories, roads, bridges and airports (Adebajo, 2010: 165). Again, 
here is another example of China using aid as a strategically to make it more attractive to 
African countries in the early years of Sino-African affiliations. 
 
In addition, China used aid projects such as agricultural cooperation to boost agricultural 
production in Africa by purchasing or leasing farms for productions intended for local 
markets. This initiative was introduced in 2006 through the establishment of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), as well as the China-Africa Development Fund in 2007. 
This resulted in the completion of 221 agricultural cooperation projects, 47 irrigation and 
water conservation projects, and 66 other types of projects by 2010 around Africa. Through 
FOCAC, 100 senior Chinese experts in agriculture were sent to various African countries and 
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established 10 agricultural sites (Okolo and Akwu, 2016: 50), while 15,000 of its medical 
experts have been dispatched to 42 African countries (Adebajo, 2010: 167).  
 
China further cancelled US$3.83billion in debt globally, the majority of which aimed towards 
African countries (Ayodele and Sotola, 2014). Authors Okolo and Akwu (2016: 46) state that 
China’s engagement in Africa is a great opportunity for the continent and their pursuit of 
deepening the South-South cooperation. China has provided its architectural skills, expertise 
and knowledge in various projects such as the building of the African Union Secretariat in 
Ethiopia – described as ‘China’s gift to Africa’. Construction of the building cost US$200 
million and promoted trade between the Asian giant and the continent. Notable improvements 
also included ‘hard infrastructure’ across African countries, for example, in Namibia China 
Guangdong Nuclear Power holding Corporation made a US$1.23 billion offer in 2011 for 
Kalahari Minerals in a bid to secure a stake in the country’s uranium sector. Similarly, in 
Zimbabwe, Chinese investments have focused on the improvement of agriculture and mining 
sector. As a result, Anjin Investments financed almost US$400 million into operation in the 
Marange diamond mining (Mapaure, 2014: 15). China has positioned itself over essential 
sectors such as in mining, utilities, and telecommunications. In 2000, overall trade statistics 
between China and Africa reached US$10.9 billion. In 2009, it hit US$91 billion, in 2014 
US$222 billion, and in 2015, trade hit US$300 billion (Haggai, 2016). 
 
Arguments of neo-imperialism  
Capital inflow in China during the 1970s and 1980s was minimal, because of the reluctance 
of international investors not keen on investing in a socialist economy with weak institutions 
(Prasad and Wei, 2005: 3). Therefore, in March 1978 China announced that in the next 
coming ten years, the country would focus on 120 key modernisation projects, which would 
include thirty electric power stations, seven trunk railroads, eight coal mines, ten new steel 
plants, five harbours and ten new oil and gas fields domestically (Power et al. 2012: 52). 
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Power et al. (2012: 50 and 89-91) in their research found that, within years of completing 
Tazara railway project, China’s domestic and foreign policy changed and gravitated towards 
an ideology that prioritised economic modernisation via access to foreign markets, 
technology and capital. The country’s astounding economic transformation, economic 
reforms, and ‘open door’ policy was a success, as China embarked on global economic 
outreach and ventured into new regions and markets like Africa. The Chinese government in 
the late 1990s encouraged state-owned and private companies to invest abroad, more 
especially in resource-rich countries (Hanauer et al. 2014: 6).  
 
Carmody (2016: 72) explains that between 1978 and 2005, the trade volume of China 
increased by 70 times, with a share of the world trade increasing from 0.78% to 7.7% in 
2002, China overtook the U.S as the single biggest receiver of FDI. At the same time, it was 
producing half of the world’s clothing and footwear and most of its computers. It comes as no 
surprise that between 1981 and 2005 China was able to lift 600 million Chinese people out of 
poverty. In addition, in 2012 for the first time, China overtook the U.S as the world’s largest 
trading nation. China’s GDP was worth US$11064.66 billion – reaching an all-time high in 
2015. The GDP value of China represents 17.85% of the world economy (Trading 
Economics, 2017). According to Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2016: 11), since 1992 Chinese 
manufacturing imports grew at an average annual rate of 18%, making the country the third 
importer of manufacturing in 2007 globally. 
 
Carmody (2016: 75) suggests that China’s ideology of accumulating wealth and advancing 
their economy includes taking various measures to achieve their economic goal. It comes as 
no surprise that China is often under fire for their domestic labour practices – such as making 
employees work long hours until the job is complete. It is widely reported in popular media 
that an average of thirteen miners dies a day in the coal mining industry in China. 
 
Globally, a country can attract FDI based on three factors, namely, market size (total PPP 
GDP), the access of natural resource as a share of that particular economy as well as good 
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governance. In regards to governance, the rule of law needs to be applicable. Also, the 
presence of political stability and the absence of violence/ or terrorism. In practice, the 
allocation of Chinese FDI across 49 African countries largely follows the global pattern. 
From 1998 – 2012 there were about 2,000 Chinese firms investing in 49 African countries 
(Chen et al. 2015: 3-6).  
 
However, when analysing Chinese allocation of its outbound direct investment (ODI) to 
Africa, it was found that its allocation correlates with market size, natural resource wealth, 
and often-political stability, but has a negative correlation with the rule of law, while property 
rights/rule of law may not matter at all. This analysis supports that Chinese FDI is attracted to 
politically stable environments, without reference to the rule of law. This is the reason why 
China is able to do business with democratic countries and authoritarian countries (Chen et 
al. 2015: 7).  Likewise, African leaders also prefer China in contrast to Western governments’ 
preconditions to be transparent in resource allocation and conduct democratic practices 
(Hanauer et al. 2014:6). Controversial countries were China was awarded oil contracts 
includes Angola, Sudan, Congo-Brazzaville and Equatorial Guinea (Alden and Alves, 2009: 
07). 
 
FDI into Africa from China is mainly investment in natural resources. To keep their 
governments running, the majority of African countries generate their revenues from their 
natural resources. In rich oil countries, governments can generate 60% of revenue, while 
governments rich in other natural resources can generate 45%. The literature reveals that 
about 34 African countries are currently ‘mineral dependent’ for more than 25% of their 
tangible exports. From this number, about 19 countries rely on minerals for more than half of 
their exports – the rest are predicted to become increasingly dependent. Considering this, it 
can be concluded that almost all African natural resources are sold abroad. This continuation 
of natural resource exploration, coupled with high commodity prices, is set to keep these 
countries dependent on their natural resources for a long time, undermining any development, 
hence many African countries experience a resource curse (Hanauer et al. Morris, 2014: 6).  
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With the latter in consideration, arguments have claimed that China’s approach in Africa 
resembles neo-imperialism. According to Rotberg (2008: 1), China is economically driven 
and needs to continue feeding its massive industrial surge. Therefore, it is not interested in 
colonising Africa but rather wants to embrace its immense economic ambitions. As a rising 
global power, it is growing at a rate of 10 – 11% annually while extracting basic commodities 
from all over Africa. China’s appetite for natural resources is robust and invests in long terms 
deals, securing their permanent supply within many resource-rich African countries. China 
has made sure that it is a trade partner, which can offer almost everything to African 
countries. This includes supplying cheap manufactured goods, military firepower, and 
technical assistance. Based on China’s global engagement, it can be concluded that large 
foreign exchange reserve that China is holding as well as the large amount of FDI it attracts it 
is justified to say that China is following a more mercantilist policy (Prasad and Wei, 2005). 
 
The first scramble of Africa amongst major European powers occurred in the late nineteenth 
century. In 1884-5, rules for the division of Africa amongst colonial powers were established 
based on the principle of ‘effective occupation’ – meaning that a European power had to 
show the capability of effective control that consisted of troops and administration when it 
claims a particular territory. Thereafter, economies were structured to produce natural 
resources and wealth for Europe. Essentially, imperialism was about empire and the 
expansion of the European core by using rulers in the periphery to work for core instead of 
their constituencies. In current times, we see a geo-economic competition between different 
economic powers for Africa’s natural resource (Carmody, 2011: 02). In addition, the colonial 
powers created a system of importing raw materials cheaply with the objective of selling 
manufactured goods back into the colonies. Hence, the philosophy of building railroads from 
the colonies to the coast, in order to transport them to Europe.  This unequal trade still 
persists, were Sino-Africa trade relations are in favour of China, as well as the rehabilitation 
of railways infrastructure and the establishment of various Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 
across the continent. However, it's important to note that this is the case also with traditional 
African trade partners such as the U.S and E.U (Carmody, 2011: 03).  
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As mentioned before, natural resources were central to the first scramble of Africa. These 
resources were (and still are) useful towards industrialisation and advancement of technology. 
For instance, Harms (1975: 73) affirms that the taxing of the rubber boom trade in the Congo 
during the last decade of the nineteenth century was a convenient way to finance colonial 
conquest. Likewise, rubber played an equally important role in French Guinea, Angola, the 
Gold Coast, while other parts like Western Sudan dependent heavily on the resource. Rubber 
was used for the manufacturing of car tyres and condoms (in which birth rates fell to 
Congolese rubber) in Europe and U.S (Carmody, 2011:3). Similarly, with the new scramble 
of Africa natural resource are significant with the expansion of global economic power and 
more importantly toward the production of manufactured goods. 
 
Another important point is the collusion between MNCs and the state, which led to labour 
disputes and violent clashes during the rubber boom in the Congo.  The state would give 
MNCs rights to control workers and the extraction of rubber (Harms, 1975: 85). According to 
Carmody (2011, 03), an estimated 10 million people were killed in the Congo during the 
Belgian colonialism in search of ivory and rubber. People refusing to search or tap rubber 
were either killed or got one of their hands cut off. There was no regard for African lives. I 
argue on similar patterns of what happened in the Congo to recent times were “conflict 
minerals” were responsible for the death of millions (Enough Project, 2016). Also, violent 
conflict around oil, diamonds, and other resources have been reported in popular media 
(Carmody, 2011: 06). 
 
Theorists such as Okoro et.al. (2011: 94) argues that China is using “diplomatic friendship” 
and their commonality with African countries of being victims of a Western imperialism as a 
facade towards China’s own neo-imperialistic offences on African countries. Furthermore, 
Odeh (2014: 156) argues that although China is not a colonising power today, there is a great 
possibility for it to do so decades to come. My analysis is that China does have neo-
imperialistic characteristics. China is not formally occupying territories like previous 
imperialist powers; however, they do have similar patterns of engagement which includes 
resource exploitation, imbalance trade, violent clashes with locals, environmental damage, 
and the constant need for natural resources.  
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Statistics available from the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
(MOFOCOM), the National Bureau of Statistics of PRC (NBS), and the State Administration 
of the PRC (SAFE), indicate that at the end of 2013, China’s investment in Africa amounted 
to 26.1% in construction, 14% in finance, 13.4% in manufacturing, 5.1% in scientific 
research and 5.1% in technical services. These figures only accounted for 1% of China’s total 
outbound investment globally (Han, 2016: 2). China’s investment in African countries is 
substantial, however modest compared to the rest of the world; it has six times as much direct 
investment in the U.S. as in Africa. Chen et.al (2015, 06) regards China’s investment 
contributing to economic growth. Based on the findings of these figures, the argument is that 
China’s economic strategy desires a global outreach. In addition, it's for that reason Han 
(2016: 02) states that Africa remains important to China but not on a large scale globally.  
 
Tull (2006: 473) points out an important argument, which argues that China will not per se 
have a positive impact on developing economies in Africa. This is because China is not 
motivated by an unselfish and moral motive to assist African countries to develop and reduce 
poverty. The relationship from the beginning was centred on the prospect of creating wealth 
and surpassing Western hegemony in Africa. Furthermore, Chinese South-South solidarity 
should not be taken at face value. For instance, former Zimbabwean President Robert 
Mugabe travelled to China in 2005 to request funds during its economic crisis due to 
sanctions imposed by the U.S and EU. China only provided US$6 million for gain imports. 
Again in 2009, China paid US$3 billion for exclusive access to Zimbabwe's extensive 
platinum rights, a contract estimated to be worth US$ 40 billion (Mapaure, 2014: 13 - 17). 
This shows that China puts the emphasis more on the business side rather than their rhetoric 
massage being a developmental partner.   
 
Analysis from the Trilateral Dialogue conference (2013: 55), emphasised that Western 
efforts aiming at encouraging good governance and improve human rights in African have 
been undermined by Chinese oil companies that operate in authoritarian countries. Concerns 
over human rights abuses, violence and corruption, and damage to the local environment are 
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often legitimised under the guise of non-interference. Giry (2004) evaluates China’s 
involvement in Sudan to have contributed to an unstable regional situation, terrorism and 
weapon proliferation. Between 2004 and 2006 China provided about 90% of the small arms 
entering Sudan, as well as further selling the country US$100 million worth of Shenyang and 
F7 fighter jets (Carmody, 2016: 80). In the case of Equatorial Guinea, China has imported oil 
from the controversial and corrupt government. It also sold arms to Ethiopia and Eritrea 
during their bloody civil war in 1998 and 2000 (Adebajo, 2010: 168). Carmody (2016: 82) 
contends that, because China is an authoritarian state, it continues to maintain relations with 
other authoritarian states. The country’s strategy in Africa is also characterised by different 
elements of clientelism with their African allies, both soft and hard power.  
 
In addition, Thakur (2009: 14) found that Ethiopia views China as a developmental partner, 
due to Chinese FDI into the country, trade deals, economic co-operation projects and 
development assistance. Admittedly, Ethiopia’s economy has improved with much increase 
towards business. However, infrastructure projects dealing with building roads and bridges 
have been a concern, due to their poor quality, with the exception of Addis Ababa and other 
urban areas. Some Chinese firms are accused of submitting bids below costs in order to 
secure contracts, consequently disregarding quality-building materials. Numerous negative 
implications arise, firstly, the poor quality of infrastructure will have to be regularly be 
maintained and ultimately cost the country money. Secondly, inadequate structures pose a 
safety issue, and possibly the loss of lives if a structure collapses. Thirdly, construction 
projects built by Chinese firms be labelled untrustworthy; and lastly, local businessmen and 
women are often overlooked for construction projects, which then directly becomes 
detrimental to Ethiopian businesses and growth in general (Thakur, 2009: 14).  
 
2.4 Conclusion  
According to Adisu et.al (2010) analysis, the Chinese model of investment and infrastructure 
loans known as the "Beijing Consensus" has been an important approach for China. Unlike 
the former Washington Consensus which was a model of authoritarianism and heavy state 
involvement in the economy, the Beijing Consensus has also attributed to China’s strong 
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government intervention which has allowed China to gather large amounts of resources 
towards economic growth and has further been a model China uses to engage with its African 
trade partners (Yang, 2011: 28). In addition, this model of investment has demonstrated to 
have brought economic growth objectives and foreign policy that guided investment along 
with the "no strings attached" approach which has proven to be detrimental in some African 
countries. As mentioned earlier, China promoted itself as an alternative developmental 
partner and African leaders used this as an opportunity to capitalise on the relationship. The 
Asian giant has invested in previously Western failed projects, especially in physical 
infrastructure, and agriculture – which has proven to be positive towards crucial African 
development (Ayodele and Sotola, 2014).  
 
This chapter showed challenges and opportunities of the Sino-African relations and argued 
that the consequences of these relations have negatively affected economic growth and 
quality of institutions, the perpetuation of human rights abuses such as in Sudan. The first 
section spoke on what makes resources-rich economies and how these resources contributed 
to a resource curse in many countries, simultaneously assessing their effects on this economy 
and their foreign policy with foreign investors. The second section discussed the dynamics of 
the Sino-African relations and scope of investment in various resource-rich countries. 
Thereafter it explored arguments of imperialism and if China’s neo-imperialistic 
characteristics and found that even though China does not formally occupy African 
territories, their pronounced investments in this countries prove to have neo-characteristic.  
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Chapter 3: Sino-Zambian Relations  
 
3.1 Introduction 
China and Zambia established official diplomatic relations on 29 October 1964. Zambia 
supported the “One China” policy and co-sponsored the UN General Assembly resolution to 
restore China’s seat on the Security Council in 1971. China’s construction of TAZARA 
railway line in 1975 through an interest-free loan cemented their relations, as the railway line 
was a strategic and political project, which benefited both countries. For China, it 
demonstrated its economic footprint, meanwhile for Zambia; it provided relief from the 
country’s dependence on then apartheid South African government at the time (Leslie, 2016: 
90-91).  
 
On the one hand, China has successfully benefited from this relation by securing key natural 
resources, moreover copper, while Zambia's economy has improved its economic growth 
rate, investment in infrastructure and much-needed capital, more especially after the 2000s. 
However, both countries have come across unavoidable challenges which some are 
consequential for Zambia than China. In spite of the 2010 growth rate of 7.6% for Zambia, 
the country remains one of the poorest in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) region. This is because the country has failed to capitalise on the economic benefits 
of Zambia's copper production for economic growth and failed to diversify the economy in 
search of alternative ways to generate revenues.  
 
This chapter shows that the dynamics of the Sino-Zambian relations supports the argument 
that China’s investment in this resource-rich country has become detrimental toward 
Zambia’s growth. In addition, China’s economic growth or slowdown has a direct impact on 
Zambia’s economy. The first section will provide a historical background of mining in 
Zambia - from nationalisation to privatisation. Thereafter, a discussion of the dynamics of the 
Sino-Zambia relations will be in the second section. Furthermore, the section will include the 
scope of China’s investment in Zambia coupled with the issues of labour disputes, 
31 
 
environmental damage, and the lack of corporate social responsibility by Chinese mining 
companies compared to other foreign investors. In the third section, an evaluation of Chinese 
non-interference policy is evaluated when an anti-China candidate ran for the 2006 and 2011 
Presidential elections. 
 
3.2 History of mining in Zambia  
Copper extraction dominated the mining sector for more than seven decades since the first 
commercial mine opened in 1928. Although other minerals existed such as gold, emeralds, 
lead, zinc, cobalt, nickel, bauxite, natural gas and more, copper was regarded with high value 
as it generated bigger revenues for the country (Muneku,  2002: 49). During its peak in the 
1960s and the early 1970s, copper generated 80% of the country’s revenue from foreign 
exchange, 50% of government revenue and at least 20% of total formal sector employment 
(Simutanyi, 2008: 01).  
 
The Zambian government nationalised the copper sector in 1969 through a process called 
Mulungushi reform in order to maximise returns, improve social and economic development 
for the Zambian population, and transfer economic power following decades of Britain 
colonial rule. Zambian government further acquired a 51% share-hold in a number of 
privately run commercial, financial and industrial sectors to create a conglomerate parasternal 
sector (Muneku, 2002: 49). During the Kaunda government (which ruled from 1964 to 1991), 
copper mining transformed the Copperbelt area into the most developed area in Zambia and 
according to Li (2010: 06) provided to some degree social development. Meanwhile, the 
mining towns operated the “cradle to grave” policy (Mutesa, 2010: 176), whereby worker’s 
children had free education; workers families received subsidised housing, food, electricity, 
water and transportation. 
 
Simutanyi (2008: 01) in his study found that the effects of nationalisation from 1969 to 1975 
led to the increase of investment in the construction of schools, hospitals, roads from the 
revenues generated through copper sales. During that period, copper was at its peak and 
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attracting substantial foreign investment. However, the performance of copper dramatically 
declined after 1975 until the end of 1982. The economic global shock attributed towards the 
collapse of commodity prices during this period. Moreover, the increase in oil prices, coupled 
with the poor operational management of Zambian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
contributed to the economy’s slowdown. All these factors pushed the government to seek 
assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank under certain 
conditions such as devaluating Zambia’s currency, trade liberalisation, reduction in the mine 
labour and general wage freeze. Although most of the conditions were met by 1984, the 
government was in a crisis and unable to improve the situation. This resulted in the inability 
to finance social welfare programmes - education and health system was affected the hardest. 
Furthermore, the standard of living dramatically dropped, to the point where daily strikes and 
food riots became a norm (Simutanyi, 2008: 2). 
 
The government was no longer able to fulfil their role following the adoption of the structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank. The Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines Limited (ZCCM) took over responsibilities of the government as 
instructed by then President Kenneth Kaunda. ZCCM provided health, education and social 
services in the mine communities even though the company was not making money. ZCCM 
was further tasked to pay political appointees salary, buy cars for government top officials 
and other benefits for Kaunda. The core business of ZCCM diverted to serve the government, 
subsequently resulting in the poor performance of the mines in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Simutanyi, 2008: 02). 
 
When government uses state resources to meet their own government objectives, it takes 
away the capability to improve the economy and social development in the country. Toward 
the end of the 1980s, Zambia’s economy was in a dire crisis due to the poor performance of 
the copper mines which were unable to cope with the demands of the government. For 
instance, some unprofitable mines and shaft were closed down, such as mines in Ndola (an 
administrative capital of the copper belt), Mufulira (copper belt area), Luanshya and 
Chiliabombwe (Simutanyi, 2008: 02). This became the ‘boom and bust’ of a natural resource 
that was no longer able to provide employment for people and improve the livelihood 
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towards the majority of people in Zambia, causing a deadlock toward the entire economy at 
the time (Simutanyi, 2008: 02).  
 
The road to privatisation  
In 1991, when the Multi-party Democracy (MMD) came into power under the late President 
Frederick Chiluba, the government inherited Zambia’s weak economy, crippled by declining 
capital formation, high and unstable inflation, huge external debt stock, budget deficits, rising 
unemployment and poverty. The Chiluba government established the Zambia Privatisation 
Agency (ZPA) in 1992, aiming to more foreign investment. MMD had a neoliberal belief that 
government should not be involved in business and that the state’s role in the economy 
needed to be reduced. Nine years after establishing the ZPA, Zambia divested 257 SOEs and 
was left with 24 (Muneku, 2002: 50).  
 
Although the impact of privatisation has been mixed, most noticeable was the loss of jobs, 
especially in the copper sector, as SOEs were preparing for privatisation by reorganising, re-
engineering and downscaling. Muneku (2002: 50) claims that due to retrenchment; 
employment between 1992 to 2000 fell from 55,017 to below 25,000. Moreover, when RAM-
COZ copper mine in Luashya shutdown, 6,000 people lost their jobs and crippled the 
economy of that small mining town.  Muneku argues that unintended consequences of 
privatisation and the shutdown of more mines affected the greater community at large and its 
regional economy.  
 
Although to some observers privatisation was necessary, for Muneku (2002, 50) it was a 
miscalculated decision for the government to implement at that time. His observation comes 
from the job losses that occurred during the process because of SOEs were shutting down, 
others SOEs went into voluntary liquidation soon after being sold, while some were stripped 
off their assets and shipped overseas. He argues that the direct impact of privatisation and 
public reform resulted in the loss of 79,000 jobs by 1996, mostly affecting women workers 
(Muneku, 2002: 50). 
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In addition, the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) further claims that about 110,000 
mineworkers lost their jobs (Li, 2008: 08). With an estimate of six people per family, this 
ultimately directly affected about 660,000 people. As a result, the Zambian government were 
left at the mercy of foreign investors goodwill. The process of privatisation in Zambian was 
not entirely transparent. The government was accused of adopting previous governments’ 
operational systems such has management appointed through political patronage (Muneku, 
2002: 53). More especially in the privatisation of mines, it was implemented in an extremely 
secretive manner (Simutanyi, 2008: 04).  
 
Revenue from copper production was very low, from 2002 to 2006 the government received 
about US$752 million in various taxes from foreign investors holding large-scale mining 
licences. These conditions were agreed upon between the government and the mining 
companies which prescribed tax concession for periods ranging from 10 to 15 years. Mining 
companies have made astonishing profits from natural resources in Zambia, mining 
companies, especially in the copper sector have recorded to have made a total of US$652 
million in profits from 2003 to 2006, and about US$71 million went towards the national 
treasury and taxes (Simutanyi, 2008: 5-6). 
 
3.3 Dynamics of Sino-Zambian relations 
From 1991, both countries maintain a strong relationship, while Chinese private firms 
established themselves in Zambia. In 1996, China provided Zambia with the unconditional 
aid of US$21.6 million, including US$18 million soft loans aimed at the rehabilitation of 
Mulungushi Textile joint venture and US$3.6 million in non-project aid. China established 
the Bank of China (Zambia) Ltd in 1997 (Leslie, 2016: 91-92). Significantly, this led to 
China being the third largest investors in terms of FDI stock in 2006 – after Great Britain and 
South Africa (Bastholm and Kragelund, 2010: 211).  The Zambia-China Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) was the first Multi-facility Economic Zone of Zambia established 
by the Chinese government in 2007 (Haggai, 2016: 53). The East Lusaka Multi-Facility 
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Economic Zone that was inaugurated in 2009 followed by the opening of the Bank of China, 
which became the first bank to offer renminbi banking services whereby customers were able 
to make a transaction using the Chinese “people’s currency” yuan in 2011 (Leslie, 2016: 91-
92). Bilateral trade between the two countries in 1990s trade reached US$20 million, 
compared to US$300 million in 2005. In the first 10 months of 2006, trade stood at US$290 
million (Mutesa, 2010: 170). In 2014, it amounted to US$3.8 billion and US$4 billion in 
2016. These figures reveal that, US$2.84 billion in exports to China and US$987 million in 
imports (Kuo, 2017).  
 
Zambia’s main export to China is tobacco, cotton, sugar, coffee and copper. Meanwhile, 
China’s export to Zambia consists of textiles, apparel, food products, electronics and 
automobiles (Mutesa, 2010: 170). China has since become the main investor in Zambia in 
2015. The Asian country has provided FDI amounting to US$5.3 billion work of project as 
well as the existence of more than 280 companies, including Chinese company that launched 
the construction of the Kafue Gorge Lower Hydropower project in 2015. The project is 
acknowledged as the largest investment in the country’s energy infrastructure in more than 
four decades (Leslie, 2016: 92).   
 
In the past decade, Zambia has experienced rapid growth. Its GDP grew above 7% annually 
between 2005 and 2014. Investor confidence in the country has become extraordinary, due to 
Zambia’s democratic credentials that saw the country’s ability to hold five successful 
multiparty elections since the return of multiparty politics in 1991. In addition, growth was 
attributed to the rise in global commodity prices as more FDI flows into the country, more 
especially for the extraction of copper. However, its reliance on copper and lack of economic 
diversification contributed negatively toward the pace of its sustainable growth which to 
translate to development for its population. The 2014/2015 slowdown of the global economic 
decreased the demand of copper,  affecting China’s trade patterns with the country by 
repositioning its economy toward consumer-led growth and less from export and investment 
(Haggai, 2016: 60). For instance China’s annual GDP declined to 7.5% in 2013/2014 and 
6.9% in September 2015 (Haggai, 2016: 61), towards the end of 2015, Zambia’s currency, 
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the kwacha, was hit the hardest compared to any African currency by losing 42% of its value 
against the dollar (Ford, 2016: 75).  
 
I argue that Zambia has a potential to diversify their economy by looking at other sectors 
such as agriculture, infrastructure developments, tourism and manufacturing. It is not 
sustainable to continuously depend on copper because Zambia’s economic success or failure 
is often and directly influenced by external economic shook. The Zambian Development 
Agency, through the Zambian government offer incentives for investors investing in key 
priority incentives such as agricultural, energy, infrastructure, manufacturing and mining 
sectors, therefore, alternative avenues of generating revenue are available but underutilised 
(Haggai, 2016; 61). 
 
The scope of Chinese investment in Zambia  
Bastholm and Kragelund (2010: 211) assert that acquiring reliable quality data on Chinese 
FDI in Africa is a difficult task. Both the Chinese and Zambian sources provide aggregate 
data that is often contradictory. For instance, Bastholm and Kragelund (2010: 211) explain 
that their research findings revealed that in 2006 there were more than 200 Chinese 
companies investing in Zambia, translating into the stock of Chinese FDI reaching US$570 
million. However, there were 143 Chinese investments approved by Zambia Development 
Agency (ZDA) by the end of 2006. Nonetheless, the information available still provides an 
insight into the scope of Chinese investment in Zambia.  
 
According to Kamwanga and Koyi (2009: 11), China's main investment in Zambia involves 
resource extraction. However, Bastholm and Kragelund (2010: 212) adds that by 2009 the 
mining sector only constituted of 5% of companies directly investing in the sector, while the 
rest have invested in manufacturing by 43%, services by 21%, construction by 16%, 
agriculture by 13% and timer by 2%. He highlights that the majority of investment in the 
manufacturing industry is mining related. For example, the Beijing General Research 
Institute of mining and metallurgy (BGRIMM Explosives), Chambishi Copper Smelters and 
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Sino-Metals Leaching Plants investment are manufacturing companies related to the mining 
sector. More importantly, to note, all these three Chinese companies are subsidiaries of the 
same company, China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group – the same company that owns 
China’s largest mine in Zambia, the Chambishi mine in the Copperbelt. Therefore, all 
mining-related activities make up at least 70% of the total value of all registered Chinese 
investment in Zambia (Bastholm and Kragelund, 2010: 212).  
 
While this is the case, not all Chinese companies are registered with the ZDA, the 
Association of Chinese Corporations in Zambia (ACCZ), or the line ministries for that 
matter. These include small manufacturing and construction companies that were reported to 
have been set-up by employees who previously worked for large-scale Chinese companies. 
Furthermore, other companies include those that are in the construction sector and are de jure 
Zambia, which means that a Zambian partner will own 51% of the company but in fact are de 
facto Chinese. In essence, the Zambian partner is used as a front (Bastholm and Kragelund, 
2010: 212).  
 
The Asian giant has secured direct equity interest in copper, coal and manganese mines, 
resulting in a positive improvement for struggling mines during the 2008 international 
financial crisis (Li, 2008: 08). It is worth noting that, FDI can either have a good or bad 
impact on a country. The recipient of the FDI needs to set up institutions structures that will 
be able to translate the commodity windfall into sustainable development, coupled with a 
legitimate government that will manage the FDI. China became a major stakeholder in 
Zambia after it acquired 85% of Chambishi copper reserves in 1998 (Alden and Alves, 2009: 
15). It has made significant progress in acquiring assets, directly and indirectly through the 
extension of concessional loans for infrastructure. It is the so-called “economic statecraft” of 
securing long-term supply and access to resources. Alves (2013: 07) explains economic 
statecraft as a strategy of a government to influence another government’s behaviour in their 
favour. This particular strategy can be executed in two ways, which are either negative or 
positive. 
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Negative economic statecraft is using economic sanctions, and punishment to influence a 
government to adhere to particular demands. On the other hand, positive economic statecraft 
involves using a softer approach of extending economic incentives or rewards in order to 
influence a government to comply with the lender's foreign policies. For example, China used 
concessional loans for the infrastructure as a foreign policy instrument during the 
construction of the Tazara railway, which was favourable for China's political aims in 
Zambia in the late 1960s and 1970s. As a result, China was able to influence the decision in 
their favour in order to access natural resources. These types of infrastructure-for-resources 
deals/ or loans are also welcomed by the Head of State because China's interest is generally at 
1.5% - 3% below the benchmark of the People's Bank of China, and the repayment plans can 
take up to 20 years (Alves, 2013: 08). 
 
Labour disputes, environmental damage and lack of CSR  
As mentioned previously, CNMC bought the Chambishi Mine, setting the opportunities for 
more Chinese mining companies to invest in Zambia's mining sector. Consequently, the 
arrival of Chinese mining companies has not always been welcome. Developments of the 
agreements between Chinese mining companies and Zambian government have caused a 
great deal of tension, conflict and violence with the Zambians.  During privatisation 
processes, the Zambian population were not part of the process. Copper mines were then sold 
for low prices and with few strings attached which the government would have bargained 
with. Instead, the process weakened the Zambian government’s position. For that reason, 
Chinese companies are not entirely trusted by the Zambian population. Furthermore, Chinese 
companies have a bad reputation regarding labour practices while neglecting their role for 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), compared to other foreign investors such as   South 
African, Canadian, Swiss and British companies (Li, 2010: 06).    
 
Zambians often complain about Chinese business practices. Part of the problem is that the 
government is not doing much to protect workers, especially mineworkers. Moreover, 
Chinese private companies turn to behave outside the law without any penalties. For instance, 
in 2005 at the Chambishi mine, 49 miners were killed in an explosion, putting on the 
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spotlight safety concerns. 2 years later in 2007, at the same mine during a protest by miners, 
workers were killed. In 2008, at a copper smelter, a Chinese manager was beaten following a 
labour dispute (Chan, 2013: 26). Another incident happened in October 2010, where Chinese 
supervisors shot 13 protesting miners at the Collum coal mine. The mine belonged to a 
private Chinese owner. Shocked by what transpired at the mine, both the government and 
Chinese embassy ordered the settlement of the dispute in favour of the miners. Following 
that, the supervisors were arrested (Chan, 2013: 30).  
 
Locals complain that working for a Chinese company (either private or state-owned), 
accusing Chinese managers refusing to integrate with them, incidents of bullying, racism and 
low wages (Chan, 2013: 30). In addition, Kamwanga and Koyi (2009: 28) claim that Chinese 
mining companies often rely on hiring heavy equipment rather than buying new ones. This 
practice defeats the purpose of development and further limits technology transfer in that 
sector. It allows Chinese to have the control and all the decision making power. It does not 
harness any new skills and the use of technology. Chinese companies are known for hiring 
unskilled and semi-skilled Chinese labour. The key issues have cause grievances amongst 
Zambians. This defeats the purpose of Sino-Zambian relations to have a positive impact on 
Zambian lives through various developmental projects. According to Zambian law, the only 
time foreign skills should be used is if the country was unable to source the skill locally 
(Museta, 2010: 172). 
 
The hiring of Chinese workers in both Chinese SOEs and private companies involved in large 
and public infrastructures are sometimes referred to as “the import of workers” – an issue that 
has sparked controversy. Furthermore, the Chinese have defended their actions by arguing 
costs, cultural affinity, and productivity (Park, 2009: 06). I do not agree with the arguments 
of the hiring of Chinese workers as it undermines the very factor of what they have presented 
to various African countries. The China-Africa Corporation is not only meant to assist in the 
development of African countries but to also transfer training and technology. Many African 
countries have high levels of unemployment and often struggle to create jobs for their own 
citizens. 
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Furthermore, the argument of cultural affinity for instead is one example of how social unrest 
between Zambians and Chinese nationals has worsened over time. Chines workers are often 
accused of occupying jobs intended for locals specifically in construction jobs and small-
scale trading. By creating a sense of differences amongst people and workers, the hierarchy is 
formed and further exacerbates social unrest as other factors of discontentment continues. For 
that, reason issues of racism and xenophobia become increasingly evident.  
 
A very thorny issue has always been “poverty wages”, which described the nature of 
rumination by Chinese companies. Mutesa (2010:170) contends that Chinese companies in 
comparison to companies owned by the West and India pay their Zambian employees below 
the minimum wage of 268, 00 kwacha (K) (about US$70) per month. He adds that this is the 
same amount of money the World Bank uses to classify people who are living in poverty. 
Such mining companies include Chinese owned Collum coal mine which pays its employees 
US$60 a month.  Non-Ferrous Company (NFC) Africa mining is also accused of paying 
employees between US$50-US$60 a month. In 2011, the mine (and JCHX Mien Construction 
Zambia Ltd) dismissed 2,000 mineworkers who went on strike and refused to return to work 
(Leslie, 2016: 93). Mutesa (2010: 1741) explains poverty wages is caused by Chinese FDI 
having a downward pull on wages, subsequently not improving working condition of workers 
in Chinese mines. 
 
Comparatively, disparities in wage and salary differences between Chinese and Zambian 
workers have created a problem for companies such as the Zambia-China Mulungushi 
Textiles (ZCMT), with the Chinese government as the majority shareholder. At a particular 
period, a Chinese general manager was apparently being paid K17 million while their 
Zambian deputy general manager was getting paid K3.5 million. Issues of this nature have 
emerged in other state-owned and private-owned Chinese companies in Zambia (Museta, 
2010: 172). Furthermore, a study by Frazer and Lungu in 2007 (as cited in Leslie, 2016: 92) 
revealed that from 2,100 workers only 52 Zambians were permanent employees and 
unionised at Chambeshi. The Zambian employees also did not have medical aid or pension 
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benefits, compared to the 180 Chinese employees working at the same mine, who were on 
permanent contracts and received benefits.   
 
On the other hand, exploitative working conditions raised alarming concerns. Zambian 
employees working for Chinese companies across the country have reported of long working 
hours, and near-forced-labour, and a general disregard for good working conditions. 
Furthermore, Mutesa (2010:172) states that China is reported to have the worst mining health 
and safety records in the world. The latter is due to the demand for copper and excessive use 
of the machinery for massive production and neglecting safety and health measurements of 
their employees.  Leslie (2016:94) cites the 2011 Human Rights Watch report entitled “You’ll 
Be Fired if You Refuse: Labour Abuses in Zambia’s Chinese State-owned Copper Mines” 
which revealed that the worst human rights violations were committed by some Chinese-
owned mining companies. The report correlated with workers complains of working 12-18-
hour shifts, anti-union activities, poor health and safety issues. Brautigam (2009, 157) asserts 
that it's the government's responsibility to ensure that private companies are monitored and 
stricter regulations set in order to prevent such issues from happening. Foreign companies 
should not operate outside the law. Labour practices in Zambia by Chinese companies are an 
ongoing serious problem.  
 
In addition, CSR should play an important factor in the responsibility of foreign investors. 
Some of the criticism that both the Zambian government and Chinese mining companies are 
accused of, is that there is no particular focus on the investment in social infrastructure. 
Natural resources are located in remote or rural areas. It has been evident throughout the 
decades since the operation of mines that the government has generated revenues from 
natural resources provides few social services in those areas. Moreover, when foreign 
businesses start operating in those areas, the government does not take measurements to 
encourage CSR in the areas. Locals in mining communities have hoped for corporate to 
provide housing, schools, clinic and other services. Instead, Chinese mining company has 
invested little in social infrastructure. For instance, Chinese mine operator in Chambishi 
stopped providing essential services such as health to all dependents of its workers; they have 
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further reduced the preventative health care programs. Contribution towards the municipal 
water, sewage, and trash collection were reduced (Hanauer et al. 2014: 63 - 64). 
 
In terms of environmental issues, large-scale mining has a negative impact on environmental 
damage. Often locals in mining communities are affected by various problems such as being 
displaced, negative effects on health, safety, unemployment, access to water and agricultural 
land for their crops. Mining operation always requires tract of land for developing mines. In 
the past, foreign companies will make deals with local chiefs in mining communities, through 
negotiations and paybacks. In the case of Zambia, the early copper mines were obtained 
through negotiation and trickery between the British South African company (BSA); and not 
much has changed. The government set regulations and give out mining rights to foreign 
companies at the expense of the local people (Simutanyi, 2008: 5-6).  
 
Although in Zambia, mining companies are required to seek consent from the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) to assess the feasibility of the mines and its impact on the local 
people and further get the consent from locals before present back to the community. In 
instances where the results of the EIA are not in favour of the mining company, there have 
been highly contested by both the government and the mining company, and disregard the 
wish of the people (Simutanyi, 2008: 06). This is a clear indication of the government collude 
with external mining companies in order to benefit from an unsustainable and potentially 
environmentally damaging mining operation for personal benefits. Subsequently, the 
government has focused on forging good relations with key foreign investors such as 
Australian, British and Chinese. More especially the Chinese who have become a major 
investor in Zambia's copper sector as seen in the past decades (Smith-Hohn, 2009: 42). 
 
When the Chinese owned Non-Ferrous Corporation Africa (NFCA) was awarded 1,000 
hectors of land which was previously inhabited to embark on a project to build a smelter in 
Chambishi, they paid K500,000 (US$130) to each affected family as compensation. The 
company did not take into account the loss of livelihood and costs of relocating to towards 
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those families. Independent observers evaluated these compensations as inadequate and 
government did not step in to enforce social development programmes to ensure a smooth 
transition. For that reason, there were disputes between Chinese investors and locals 
throughout the entire process (Simutanyi, 2008: 06). 
 
Similarly, mining operation has a negative impact on the environment. ZCCM releases 
hazardous materials into the atmosphere, streams and rivers. Ultimately, this also negatively 
affects the health of locals near the mines. One of those toxins is sulphur dioxide emissions 
from smelters. When this toxin slits into the rivers and consumed by locals, it can cause 
respiratory disease, while others such as acid rain damage rivers and trees. As mentioned 
earlier, most of these mines are in rural areas, and the majority of locals in those areas rely on 
water from rivers for drinking and for their livestock as they do not have running water. 
Other areas of similar environmental issues also include Kitwe, Mufulira, Chingola and 
Ndola, where smelters released yellow fumes caused by sulphur oxide which was visible in 
the atmosphere (Simutanyi, 2008: 06).  
 
Often in the past, China has been criticised for its lack of environmental diplomacy with 
international agencies as well as non-governmental organisations (NGO). This has led to their 
bad reputation regarding environmental practices and in debates on global environmental 
governance issues. Power et.al (2012, 193) claims that since 2003, China has gradually 
attempted to improve its domestic record of dealing with environmental problems. The 
pressure from international community and its growing global responsibility as a “rising 
power” is evident from China’s willingness to improve its image in Africa and the rest of the 
globe. Unfortunately, the literature shows that more needs work needs to be done only by 
Chinese companies but foreign mining companies operating in Zambia.  
 
3.4 China's political influence in the 2006 and 2011 elections 
China has increased their business investment with political objectives (Kamwanga and Koyi, 
2009: 26). Its policy of non-interference in international affairs of the Zambian government 
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was in the spotlight during Zambia’s 2006 presidential election. The Asian giant was accused 
of meddling in the election when the opposition candidate, the late Michael Sata (from the 
Patriotic Front Party) raised his concerned over Chinese labour practices and the growing 
number of Chinese traders. He complained about the close relationship between China and 
the then ruling government MMD (Brautigam, 2009: 151). Chinese political influence had 
become increasingly more pronounced under the former MMD government, more especially 
involving the late president Levy Mwanawasa and former president Rupiah Banda 
(Masterson, 2011: 1).  
 
The incident played out in public and showed China's clear use of economic statecraft 
(towards their political gain) by threatening to cut diplomatic relations with the country 
should Sata win the elections. Similarly, Sata had also threatened to chase bogus Chinese (as 
he referred to them) out of the country and promised to crack down on corruption if he was 
elected. MMD claimed victory in the 2006 presidential elections (Brautigam, 2009: 151). 
However, Zambians continue to demonstrate their anti-Chinese sentiments, as result, China’s 
former President Hu Jintao was unable to visit Chambishi to inaugurate the Zambia-China 
Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in February 2007 due to local demonstrations across 
the country (Brautigam, 2009: 06).  
  
Sata was of the view that Chinese economic and commercial investment in Zambia 
perpetuated a neo-colonial dynamic because Zambia provides China with natural resources, 
in return of specific policies and cheap Chinese manufactured goods back into the country. It 
was for that reason Sata ran for the 2011 election (on his third attempt) campaigning by 
mobilising the growing anti-Chinese sentiment in the Copperbelt, Luapula, Lusaka and 
Northern Province (Hanauer et al. 2014: 55). Due to the growing support, Sata was receiving 
from Zambians; Chines opened a new state hospital in Lusaka weeks before the Election 
Day. Observers viewed this as a shameless attempt to gain popularity amongst people for 
Banda, who was running for re-election (Masterson, 2011).  
 .  
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Sata won the 2011 Zambian presidential elections. The election results breakdown revealed 
that Sata claimed victory in regions with significant Chinese investment (Hanauer et al. 2014: 
55).  His victory unmasked the majority of dissatisfaction of Zambians (especially in those 
areas). The outcome of the elections can be viewed as the political consequences of China's 
interference in government internal affairs, which cost the MDD as voters lost faith in the 
party’s ability to put the interest of the population (Masterson, 2011).  
 
Chinese infrastructure projects affect daily lives of locals, on whether to hire more locals or 
bring in Chinese migrants. Therefore, locals’ perception of China is determined on the 
positive impact of Chinese contribution towards economic/ commercial outcomes. Even 
though some miners are employed by Chinese mining companies and somewhat benefiting 
from the investment, perceptions can either be positive or negative. A 2010 survey by the 
Afrobarometer (a research project that measures the social, political and economic perception 
in Africa) revealed that the positive outcome of Chinese investments correlated with positive 
a perception of China by Zambians. If the investment improves the quality of life and 
economic health of the country, China will have a higher approval rating from people. Locals 
viewed China’s investment contributes to corruption and political patronage. This concept 
can be seen with the 2011 election, where negative perception on China and the MMD 
government evoked anti-China sentiments and ultimately played a role in electing a new 
government (Hanauer et al. 2014: 61-62).  
 
Unquestionably, issues of corruption and lack of transparency played an important role 
towards change. Investment deals between foreign companies and the government are often 
secretive, especially in the extractive sectors. Corruption has resulted in personal enrichment 
amongst government officials and the head of state. Enormous amounts of money are often 
involved when Chinese companies receive exclusive mining rights, licensing, regulation, 
powers over land and the export of commodities. Political elites are often accused of 
benefiting from these transactions, and the state is seen as being captured by external 
investors (Hanauer et.al, 2014: 64).  
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Following Sata’s victory, he changed his perception towards China and pledged to work 
alongside them. He instead blamed Zambia's under development on the previous government 
for not using the opportunity of properly managing the investments returns to its advantage 
(Chan, 2013: 151), and further become aware of the economic and financial benefits brought 
by the Chinese (Smith-Hohn, 2009: 41). I argue that the fact that Sata once in the office felt 
obliged to revoke his previous statement on China shows the level of Chinese influence in 
Zambia’s political affairs, and some level of state capture. However, this was not the first 
time a president had second thoughts on China. The late Frederick Chiluba initially wanted to 
work alongside Taiwan. However, following his victory in the 1991 elections, he decided that 
his government would continue to work with China. Leslie (2016: 91) contends that 
Chiluba’s government, which emphasised on privatisation and economic liberalisation, 
corresponded with China’s policy of direct economic engagement with the country. This 
supports my arguments that China’s non-interference policy does not necessarily apply in 
certain cases, especially considering the pronounced investment in that country.  
 
Zambia's political problems persisted due to patronage politics employed by the previous 
government through tactics of compromise and confrontation in order to secure power and 
support from foreign investors and political elites. Although improvements in some areas are 
evident, serious shortcomings are obvious by evaluating the standard of living of its 
population. The lack of effectively distributing wealth threatens stability in Zambia.  For 
instance, the number of young, educated individuals who are struggling to find employment 
after completing their studies. It is a potential trigger to an outbreak of violent conflict in the 
country. Unemployment stood at 50% in 2000. Moreover, neglecting key areas such as 
education, health and infrastructure remains a fundamental problem and it is a concern that 
sustainable developments are not considered when setting up investment deals with foreign 
investors, especially in the case of Chinese businesses making enormous profits the country 
(Smith-Hohn, 2009: 41). 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
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Both the Chinese and Zambian government have maintained bilateral relations as a result of 
benefiting from each other. Trade figures have shown China’s willingness to continue 
investing in Zambia. However, the developing African country is often seen as exploited for 
its natural resource and analysts argue that its crucial flaw is its over-reliance on the copper 
sector, which continues to generate the highest revenue for the government. Chinese are able 
to extract natural resources using different economic statecraft tactics, often to their 
advantage. Although, the country is developed in other areas; the standard of living for 
ordinary Zambians remains poor. The Zambian government needs to relook at their relations 
with China and work toward an effective system that will encourage economic and social 
prosperity for its population and the entire country.   
 
The first section provided a historical background of mining in Zambia; from nationalisation 
to privatisation. Although nationalisation was short lived it provided some improvement 
towards social development before the government decided to privatise. The process of 
privatisation was not entirely transparent resulting in locals being discontent with the 
government. In addition, many mineworkers lost their jobs during the process of privatising 
copper mines. Thereafter, the second section discussed the dynamics of the Sino-Zambia 
relations, the scope of China’s investment in Zambia coupled with issues of labour disputes, 
environmental damage, and the lack of corporate social responsibility by Chinese mining 
companies compared to other foreign investors. In the third section, an evaluation of Chinese 
non-interference policy was tested when the late former president Sata ran for the 2006 and 
2011 Presidential elections.  
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Chapter 4: Sino-Nigerian Relations 
 
4.1 Introduction  
China and Nigeria established official diplomatic relations in February 1971. During the 
1980s and 1990s, Nigeria was experiencing a series of military coups; meanwhile, China was 
transforming itself into a global power (Odeh, 2014: 155). Due to economic sanctions 
imposed by Western nations against Nigeria’s General Sani Abacha’s military regime (who 
ruled from 1993 – 1998) over human rights violations, Nigeria turned to China as a political 
and economic ally. Over the last 20 years, China’s engagement in Nigeria has spurred 
speculation on whether the relationship is based on mutual benefit or exploitation. Nigeria 
has become increasingly important to China, for the reason that it provides China with energy 
supply, as well as a market for Chinese manufactured products and services.  Srinivasan’s 
(2008: 335) study proposes that China’s investment is yet to make a significant impact on 
Nigeria’s economic growth. According to Mama (2016: 46), these developments are often 
met with both gratitude and pessimistic views of China’s engagement in Nigeria. 
 
This chapter argues that China’s investment in this resource-rich country became detrimental 
towards Nigeria’s economic transformation and political stability. In the first section, a 
historical background of the dynamics of China and Nigeria will provide insights into both 
the economic and political aspects of their relations over the past 4 decades. This section 
includes the scope of Chinese investment in the country, and further highlights opportunities 
and challenges. Nigeria’s constant battle with security, a history of military rule, the ethnic 
and religious rivalry has shaped foreign policy in the country, the second section aims to 
critically discuss these issues.  
 
4.2 The dynamics of the Sino - Nigerian relations 
The fundamental reason behind bilateral relations between states - whether trade, diplomatic 
or otherwise, is motivated by the prospects of mutual benefits in areas of politics and 
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economic gains. Traditional trade partners the U.S and Britain did little to advance significant 
development in Nigeria. In fact, evidence has shown that policies of capitalist West in sub-
Saharan West African countries severely undermined development and negatively affected 
their economies. For instance, the SAP of the IMF was a particular catalyst in Nigeria’s case 
during the General Ibrahim Babangida’s administration (1985 - 1993) (Odeh, 2014: 150-
151). With that said, it is also significant to note that Nigeria’s history of territorial division 
rooted by colonial rule continued following independence decades of military coups, civil 
war, ethnic and religious division and political instability was also detrimental for the 
economy and the country as a whole (Jackson,  2007: 590).  
 
China’s inconsistency and direct foreign policy in Africa were visible. A case in point was 
during Nigeria’s political crisis in the mid-1960s which resulted in a civil war between 
Nigeria and breakaway Republic of Biafra between 1967 – 1970, which left more than a 
million people dead (Odeh, 2014: 156). Although there were no diplomatic relations between 
the two countries when the conflict began, China was accused of having animosity towards 
pre-war Nigeria (Srinivasan, 2008: 337). It is for that reason Mama (2016, 46) highlights this 
indifference when then Chinese Premier Zhou En-Lai excluded Nigeria when he embarked 
on a 10-country trip to Africa in 1963.  
 
However, conflicting views from Srinivasan (2008: 337) claims that Nigeria was China’s 
third largest trading partner in Africa during that period, based on the belief that China had 
established a strong presence in Northern and Eastern Nigeria. Furthermore, it had made no 
pronouncement regarding its position on the Biafran conflict for two years. The Asian giant 
thereafter declared support for Biafrans in September 1968 as a counter to Soviet 
involvement and support for Nigeria. There were also unconfirmed rumours that China had 
supplied Biafra with small arms via Tanzania. However, it is equally important to note that 
China was not the only external country to support Biafra. According to Srinivasan (2008: 
337), China’s strategic move in its involvement in liberation movement in Africa gained 
favour with many African countries that provided their support toward getting a permanent 
seat at the United Nations Security Council October 1971.  
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Both countries in the 1970s continued to build modest bilateral relations, which included 
limited aid packages for Nigeria and other agreements but waned following the death of Mao 
in September 1976. Subsequently, China “abandoned Africa” when it adopted a “tiaguan 
yanghui” (hide brightness and nourish obscurity) policy designed by Deng Xiaoping’s. The 
policy prioritised China’s economic growth, building its capabilities while keeping a low 
profile in international affairs (Zhao, 2007: 36). China – Nigeria trade fell from US$57 
million in 1980 to only US$7 million in 1985 and slowly picking up to US$35 million in 
1989 (Srinivasan, 2008: 337). Ironically, Nigeria was facing political turmoil marked by the 
series of coup d’etat during that period (Odeh, 2014: 155). 
 
The June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, which left an undisclosed amount of people 
dead led to China’s isolation in the global community. China thereafter reached out to Africa 
for support, and Nigeria’s Chief of Staff went to China in October 1989. Sino-Nigerian 
relations reawakened during and after the Cold War. Trade relations increased more than in 
the previous years, coupled with six state visits by China in the 1990s. In 1993, trade reached 
US$97 million and by 1997 it increased to US$327 million (Srinivasan, 2008: 337 - 338).  
 
Sino–Nigerian relations significantly improved during General Abacha’s regime, which led 
to the establishment of Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1994. In 1997 then Chinese 
Premier Li Ping visited Nigeria and signed protocols for power generations, steel, oil, as well 
as the construction of Nigeria’s railway network by China Civil Engineering Construction 
Corporation at the cost of US$529 million. Economic relations between China and Nigeria 
provided the fourth republic of Nigeria with the highest involvement of China’s investment in 
mainstream Nigeria. Similarly, the relations improved during the first term of Obasanjo’s 
civilian administration (1999 – 2003) (Odeh, 2014: 155). 
 
The first year of Obasanjo’s second term (2003 - 2007), China provided Nigeria with patrol 
boats, combat-trainer aircraft, and MiG jet. Further developments were recorded including 
51 
 
the lunch of a Nigerian communications satellite at a cost of US$200 million by the Great 
Wall Industry Corporation of China in 2004 (Adebajo, 2010: 205) and the establishment of 
the Nigerian-China Investment Forum in 2006  (Odeh, 2014: 155). Also in 2006, at the 
China-Africa Summit in Beijing, the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation won 
a US$8.3 billion deal to build a railway in Nigeria that would link Lagos with Kano. 
Ironically, Chinese textile imports crippled the textile industry in the city that same year. The 
latter supports the papers argument that Chinese investment has detrimental effects on the 
growth of Nigeria’s economy by negatively under developing other industries meant to 
promote growth and economic diversity (Jackson, 2007: 593). In 2007, China and Nigeria 
funded a US$500 million free trade zone in Ogun to host 100 Chinese companies, due to 
Nigeria identified as one of China’s special economic zones (Adebajo, 2010: 206). Finally, 
weeks before the end of his term, Obasanjo granted China four drilling licences in exchange 
for commitments to invest US$4 billion in oil and infrastructure projects (Rindap, 2015: 23).  
 
Following Asia’s dramatic economic growth in 2004, Nigeria established a foreign policy 
towards Asian countries tagged “Oil for infrastructure”. To explore this further, John Iliffe as 
cited in (Taylor, 2015: 36) states that Obasanjo had actually offered Asian nations oil 
companies “rights of first refusal”. This was in response to earlier failed advancement of oil 
companies to extract Nigerian oil. This new open market commitment would allow oil 
companies to explore and develop oil blocks in the investment via capital, infrastructure and 
technology in Nigeria. Chinese state-owned oil company and the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) signed an agreement to develop Oil Mining Lease (OML) 64 
and 65 in the Niger Delta area in December 2004. The China National Offshore Oil Company 
(CNOOC) and NNPC thereafter signed a US$800 million contract that would guarantee 30 
thousands of barrels per day to China over the 5 year period in 2005 (Taylor, 2015: 37). 
 
However, the inconsistency of leadership changes in the government was a (and still is) a 
major disadvantage towards its foreign policy. This is because it will often consist of 
different conflicting foreign policy objectives. For instance, the Obasanjo administration did 
not fully capitalise on Sino-Nigerian trade relations to benefit his population, despite having a 
close relationship with China. Consequently, some of these policies were either suspended or 
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discarded when a new Head of State comes into power (Odeh, 2014: 156). Nevertheless, 
Sino-Nigerian trade relations increased by US$3 billion between 2002 and 2005, and in 2007, 
China won lucrative oil deals resulting in a trade surplus of US$250 billion with Nigeria. In 
addition, China was one of the top ten global trading partners of Nigeria by 2008 (Adebajo, 
2010: 205).  
 
Former presidents Umaru Yar’Adua (2007 – 2010) and Jonathan Goodluck (2010-2015) 
maintained relations with China during their respective terms. Nigeria secured investments in 
power and energy sector, transport infrastructure, concessionary loans for various projects. 
Chinese solely owned investments include ZTE Nigeria Investment limited, Plas Alliance 
Company, Royal Motors Company limited. CNOOC limited made payments for a 45% stake 
in the Akopo oil field, the total deal offered to CNOOC was worth US$2.7 billion. In 
addition, Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was offered four oil blocks in 
return for the rehabilitation of the Kaduna oil refinery worth US$2 billion. The China Exim 
Bank also partly funds thermal power stations such as Ugehelli, Geregu, Papalanto, Alaoji 
and Omotosho power plants, which are handled by the Chinese (Rindap, 2015: 24 - 23).  
 
Furthermore, finding buyers for oil in Nigeria are increasingly becoming a problem. In 
October 2014, the African country was exporting 2 millions of barrels per day, in the same 
year; the U.S stopped importing oil in Nigeria due to the discovery of alternative energy 
supplies (shale gas and light tight oil). Currently, Brazil, India and China have become 
important investors in the extraction of oil and gas for the Nigerian government (Taylor, 
2015: 36). The consequential effects of Sino-Nigerian relations are that Chinese investors 
have a history of preferring to deal with Nigeria’s public sector and not expanding business 
opportunities with the Nigerian private sector. Chinese investors typically direct their trade 
efforts to Abuja through government-level agreements. As a result, the practice of 
transparency and independent initiatives under building strong self-sufficient economies is 
undermined. Nigerian entrepreneurial spirit is also indirectly discouraged (Mama, 2016: 47). 
Critics also blame the fact that the oil industry is abused, with Asian MNCs awarded access 
to high potential oil assets, despite some failing to deliver on infrastructure commitments 
(Rindap, 2015: 25). 
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Gu’s (2016: 159) study illustrates that Chinese investors are mainly motivated by the access 
to local markets in Africa; intense competition in domestic markets; transfer abroad of 
excessive domestic production capability; entry into new foreign markets via export host; 
advantage of African regional and/or international trade agreements; and to access raw 
material. Furthermore, their enthusiasm to do business in Nigeria is due to commercial 
opportunities as it is the second largest economy in Africa, making the huge market very 
attractive. In essence, Nigeria could be a gateway for Chinese firms to venture into the West 
Africa sub-regional market. Gu (2016: 160) contends that Chinese entrepreneurs operating in 
Nigeria are aware of the risks and dangers of doing business in Nigeria, however, they have a 
saying which states “Despite the strong wind and wild waves, the deep water still has fish to 
be found”.    
 
Chinese investors have admitted that constraints on the quality of electricity, importing poor 
infrastructure, transportation, weak macroeconomic management, communication and labour 
regulations as some of the major problems they are facing. However, business licencing & 
operating permits, quality of the legal system, crime, corruption and bureaucracy were not 
factors they worried about (Gu, 2016: 161). Contrastingly, Nigerian investors and 
entrepreneurs are yet to significantly benefit from these relations and receive assistance from 
the Nigerian economic-diplomats that often describe their economic relations to China as 
mutually beneficial to both countries. Furthermore, Nigerian aspiring entrepreneurs are 
unable to exploit these economic-political opportunities both in their home country as well as 
in China. It is essential to note that Nigerians who want to pursue business in China are said 
to face enormous challenges, as the market in China is limited to extractive industrial crudes. 
It is for this reason that economic observers are yet to understand Nigeria's real benefits from 
the Sino-Nigerian relations (Okoro et.al. 2011: 91).  In addition, over the years not much has 
been done to reverse trade imbalances between the two countries (Odeh, 2014: 154 - 155). 
 
According to Mama (2016: 46), Chinese investments have been met with both gratitude and 
pessimistic views. Incumbent Nigerian president, Muhammadu Buhari visited the U.S and 
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China in 2015 with the aim to secure Nigeria’s long-term infrastructure-based business and 
diplomatic relations. This can be seen as necessary because the majority of previous 
infrastructure development deals were not successful.  The visit saw him signing sizable 
mutual commitments with China towards the improvement of Nigeria’s power sector, 
railways as well as an agreement to use the yuan as one of Nigeria’s foreign reserve 
currencies.  Economics professor, Owuala as cited in (Mama, 2016: 46) claims that the 
agreements could potentially move Nigeria’s economy towards a more diversified one if its 
goods or services are denominated in renminbi (yuan). However, it would be difficult to 
predict if it will replace the U.S dollar as a major trading currency (Mama, 2016: 47). 
 
Nigeria benefited from Chinese companies building infrastructure at low cost without 
conditions to privatise Nigeria’s SOEs compared to Western conditions. This correlates to the 
fact that FDI in Nigeria is handed in both public and private sectors. In regards to the private 
sector, Chinese have also collaborated in joint ventures with Nigerian companies, such as 
light manufacturing, agro-allied (Okoro, 2011: 105). An example of successful high profile 
public sector-led infrastructure developments included one during Obasanjo's administration 
when the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation’s (CCECC) housing project in 
2000. The project built 5,000 housing for international athletes who were taking part in eighth 
Abuja All-Africa Games (Mama, 2016: 47).  
 
Sino-Nigerian relations are coupled with various challenges. One negative impact is in 
regards to the present state of infrastructure facilities such as power, rail network system and 
communication in Nigeria, which is poor. The Nigerian government has been unable to 
effectively address this issue with their Chinese partners. Secondly, the wide range of 
imbalance in trade has been a major concern due to the fact that, trade is often in favour of 
China. Despite various non-oil investment by the Chinese, technology transfer has not been 
significant. Chinese firms have been accused of bringing equipment and Chinese technicians 
for projects. This has also been the case in Zambia. Lastly, Chinese multi-billion investments 
in oil fields of South of Nigeria have sparked social violence and unrest. Although China is 
not the only foreign investors in the area, they have been specifically targeted by insurgent 
groups (Rindap, 2015: 26 – 27).  
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Likewise, to Europe, Japan and the U.S, China offers Nigeria trade deals combined with aid. 
Chinese aid commitments to Nigeria began in 2002, and have taken the form of loans and 
grants agreements both countries entered in the aim to assist Nigeria’s economic growth goal 
“20/2020” – which aspires to make Nigeria one of the 20 largest economies in the world by 
2020 (Okoro, 2011: 106-107).  Despite the strong revenue Nigeria has received from crude 
oil exports, it is underperforming drastically. Maladministration and the lack of strong 
institutions in the country have led to the high neglect in areas such as agriculture, 
infrastructure and technology transfer (Odeh, 2014: 161). 
 
Brautigam’s (2015: 27) study suggests that there are substantial areas of land that are agro-
climatically suitable for farming food, such as maize, soybean and sugar production. She 
further highlights a 2014 World Bank report, which confirmed that most farming is 
predominantly at a subsistent level with minimal commercialisation. Most farmers are using 
this alternative way of generating revenue as a way to survive in order to support themselves 
as well as their families and not a way to participate in the market. This also shows that 
Africa remains dependent on imported food and other food products. Another major 
disadvantage that undermines farmers to participate in commercial farming and into the 
market includes major constraints of technology, the market infrastructure and farm 
management. It is for that reason that China has tapped into this market by becoming the 
main source of canned and process food imports in Nigeria. Records show that close to 40% 
of rice consumed in West Africa is imported mainly from Asia. Meanwhile, Nigeria imports 
the largest amount of rice compared to other African countries. 
 
4.3 Nigeria: Africa’s socio-economic giant  
In 2013, Nigeria’s GDP neared US$510 billion, making it the largest economy in Africa. Oil 
and gas revenue contributed 90% of total export earnings and 80% of government revenue. 
Oil and gas make up important commodities in Nigeria, with proven crude oil reserves of 37 
billion barrels – making Nigeria the largest producer of oil in Africa. Natural gas reserves are 
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estimated to be at 159 million cubic feet – which means that it is one of the top ten natural 
gas endowments in the world. The gas is of high quality and has light low sulphur and it's 
often hailed as “sweet”; making it attractive to investors. Even with the wealth of oil, Nigeria 
faces an extreme case of inequality in the world (Taylor, 2015: 30).  
 
The World Bank states that the high level of corruption has led to 80% of Nigeria’s energy 
revenue only benefits 1% of the population – including the former Head of State such as 
Goodluck Jonathan. The international financial institution verifies that the Niger Delta region 
produces 90% of Nigeria’s oil, while 75% accounts to the country’s export earnings, 
however, the wealth does not trickle down to these oil communities, like in the Niger Delta. 
Taylor (2015: 31), further points out that neopatrimonialism, corruption, malgovernance, and 
well positioned political insiders exercise ’agency’ by embezzling oil revenues, causing a 
negative impact for Nigeria’s national interest. For instance, Western analysts claim that 
Nigeria lost an average of US$4 billion – US$8 billion per year to corruption over the eight 
years of the Obasanjo administration (1999 – 2007). To elaborate, a neo-patrimonial political 
system dominates the Nigerian society, and personal authority of the “Big Man”. Often the 
population do not have rights, privileges and often live below the poverty line. 
 
Prior to the Nigerian oil boom, the agricultural industry was a key in the development of the 
economy. However, it declined over time with the concentration of oil production. Farming 
and fishing grounds were ruined due to the environmental damaged caused by unfettered oil 
exploitation. Gas flaring in the Delta is reported to be the biggest contributor to greenhouse 
gas emission in Africa, however, mainly due to Shell – which has been the constant polluter 
in the region. Apart from oil extraction activities, other significant contributors towards the 
decline of agriculture industry included, the growing human and livestock population mainly 
affecting deforestation and desertification, poaching and settlements in protected areas, road 
construction, demand for firewood and timber (Jackson, 2007; 592).  In the past, 70% of 
Africa’s top grade timber was sold to China; ironically, logging has been banned in China to 
reduce damage to the environment (Odeh, 2014: 158) 
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Watts (2013: 1015) states that oil is the largest industry in the world and notorious for its lack 
of transparency. Oil gives so much wealth and quick wealth. As a result, government and oil 
producing companies are able to conceal how much money they generate from the industry. 
The lack of transparency in the oil perpetuates the government and external powers not to be 
accountable towards wealth distribution, the instability of political life and deterioration of 
the economy.  In addition, citizens are often not able to monitor if they are getting their fair 
share of oil revenues. This has serious implications towards the growth of the economy, it is 
for that reason, Sachs, and Warner (2001: 835) concludes that oil as a resource crowd-out 
logic, such as entrepreneurial activities, innovation, non-traded manufacturing activities and 
other non-oil sectors, which are factors that are essential to drive economic growth and 
development.  
 
Furthermore, conflict arises because the Head of State continues to maintain his power, 
political survival while providing certain political favours to well-positioned political elites, 
and relevant players who support his regime.  In Nigeria, this has led to frequent violent 
clashes between the ruling party and insurgents, coupled with general discontent amongst its 
population. Thus, it is a general norm for people to resort to violence in the absence of other 
possibilities for self-advancement - including attacking Chinese communities. Militants from 
the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have been targeting oil 
installation since the mid-2000s resulting in assassinations, kidnappings, and car bombings.  
The on-going violence led to a 20% reduction in Nigeria’s oil production in 2006. MEND 
defended their violent strategy in the Niger Delta by responding to clientelism, corruption, 
patronage, and external actors engaging in the extraction of oil for personal enrichment 
(Taylor, 2015: 34). Unable to protect the area, Nigeria turned to China, which invested 
billions towards Nigeria’s energy infrastructure and security (Jackson, 2007: 593) 
 
MEND is calling for total control of oil production, with the aim to introduce fair distribution 
to Delta’s Ijaw people (Jackson, 2007: 593). Nigeria’s political authority is known for not 
having the foresight or the willingness to invest in the national public good and towards 
developmental initiatives that will build a diversified economy that is not dependent on 95% 
of its oil revenue. The dependency on commodity exports to generate revenue has damaging 
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long-term effects in terms of trade. Likewise, in Nigeria, the country mainly attracts FDI 
largely in natural resource extraction. Instead, Nigeria should focus on critical domestic 
savings and investment in various sectors (Taylor, 2015: 34).  
 
Similarly, the establishment of Boko Haram is another terrorist group responding to the 
enormous looting of state resources in Northern Nigeria by political elites and external actors. 
The group says they want to create pure Islam state ruled by Sharia law throughout Nigeria. 
Furthermore, since 2011 the group have been targeting schools, government officials, 
churches, the kidnapping of the Chibok girls. In addition, in 2014, Boko Haram militants 
from Nigeria killed a Chinese national and kidnapped 10 others in northern Cameron (Taylor, 
2015: 36). 
 
The ethnic and religious tension in Nigeria has remained a threat towards state security. Since 
independence, the country has never successfully integrated into a coherent nation.  Nigeria 
has struggled with the domination of ethnic and religious division, territorial disputes over 
natural resources simultaneously battling towards patriotism, unity, and a national 
consciousness. The legacy of colonial foundation contributed to this as the state of Nigeria 
was a formation of three separate colonial governments – the amalgamation of two 
governments in the south in 1906, and the amalgamation of the southern northern government 
in 1914. The British colonial rule would use this as a strategic tool to divide and compete 
amongst themselves while distributing revenue from the southern government to the northern 
government unfairly. A unified colonial government was formed in 1914, however, ethnic 
asymmetry and struggles for identity and autonomy were already causing tension. 
Furthermore, tensions exacerbated when the 1951 constitution introduced formal regionalism 
along the fault line of the Ibo, Hausa, Fulani and Yoruba ethnic groups.  Although Nigeria 
was granted full independence in October 1960, citizens identified themselves first by their 
tribe (Ibo or Hausa) and Nigerian second (Jackson, 2007: 589). 
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Nigerian politics was further dominated by the religious division between the Muslim north, 
with a majority of the Hausa and Fulani, and “Westernised” south led by Yoruba and Ibo 
politicians (Jackson, 2007: 590). It is apparent that there is a correlation between ethnic 
territorial division and religious affiliation. Some people turn to religious extremism because 
the state is unable to offer basic needs or rights to people. Under these conditions, the 
intervention of the military in politics, which led to continues military coups and civil war 
was inevitable from 1966 to 1979 and the return of military rule in 1999. The result of this 
shifted the balance of power while Nigerian politicians focused on strengthening their ethnic 
kin as opposed to rebuilding Nigeria’s general population and encouraging unity. For that 
reason, I argue that military rule in Nigeria resulted in weakening the process of strong 
institutions which could have led to good governance and economic development and 
perhaps prevented none-state agents to influence the country via heavy patronage to maintain 
control and limited opportunities for Nigerians as a whole. State capture in Nigeria saw non-
state agents benefiting from military rule, and further undermining free market (Jackson, 
2007: 591). 
 
Furthermore, the religious rivalry between Christian and Islam play key roles in the outcome 
of Nigeria’s political, social and economic sphere and in global events. The global 
community is concern over security issues, as this spills over to other West African countries 
and vice versa. When al-Qaida attacked New York and Washington in 2001, fighting 
between Christians and Muslim in Jos and Kano in Nigeria intensified. Similarly, when a 
Danish press in 2006 published a cartoon of the prophet Mohammed, increased violent 
clashes erupted in the streets of Nigeria, leaving dozens killed and injured and further 
displaced thousands in parts of Nigeria (Jackson, 2007: 599). Based on these events, the 
inability of the Nigerian government to stop the violence and adequately come up with a 
solution for these kinds of violent expression has made people lose hope in the government, 
and negatively impacted on the economy at large has, in fact, destabilised the country 
(Taylor, 2015: 36). Odeh (2014: 162) emphasises that the absence of true and strong 
leadership in Nigeria will ultimately be the key challenge when articulating and enforcing 
long-term developmental strategies for Nigeria’s future.  
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4.4 Conclusion  
Sino-Nigerian relations have consisted of both opportunities and challenges. Nigeria has not 
fully capitalised from these relations and a big part of that is due to its lack of diplomatic 
effectiveness and left out the majority of its population in matters of wealth distribution. Non-
accountability and the persistence of neopatrimonialism political system that still dominates 
the Nigerian society coupled with personal authority of the “Big Man” as undermined 
Nigeria’s economic transformation. I argue that the issue of a resource curse is multifaceted. 
It is not only the discovery of oil that makes authoritarian regimes become more durable and 
prolong their survival in office; corruption and violent conflicts but also because oil is a 
motivation towards wealth and self-enrichment. 
 
The first section gave a historical account of the dynamics of China and Nigeria and provided 
insights into both the economic and political aspects of their relations over the past 4 decades. 
This section included the scope of Chinese investment in the country, and further highlights 
opportunities and challenges. Nigeria’s constant battle with security, a history of military 
rule, and the ethnic and religious rivalry has shaped foreign policy in the country; the second 
section critically discussed these issues.  
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Chapter 5: The impact of Chinese manufactured goods  
 
5.1 Introduction  
China has proved itself as an economic powerhouse. In recent years, the Asian giant has 
become the first exporter of manufactured goods worldwide gaining considerable shares in 
most markets, including developing ones. Most significant products include machinery, and 
equipment, textiles and clothing industry, wood products iron and steel (Giovannetti & 
Sanifilippo, 2016: 12) Its relationship with various African countries assisted Chinese 
entrepreneurs export manufacturing goods into the continent while enjoying tax benefits and 
subsidies provided by China (Rupp, 2008: 65). On the other hand, it has provided low-
income consumers with affordable manufactured goods although concern over the quality of 
goods is still a major issue.  
 
Subsequently, Chinese manufactured goods imported in African countries have shown to be 
detrimental to Africa’s industrial growth by crowding out some non-Chinese goods, local 
goods, and further straining intra-continental trade. It is worth noting that China is no 
different from traditional African trading partners in their practices. However, since entering 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, China is continuously in the spotlight with the 
greatest number of anti-dumping cases from across the globe, with the largest number of 
cases from African developing countries (Jiang, 2008: 58).  
 
This chapter argues that Chinese manufactured goods have contributed to the lack of Nigeria 
and Zambia’s industrial transformation by reducing local production and entrepreneurial 
activities in various sectors. The first section explores international trade pattern, issues of 
dumping and contingent protection measures. Chinese trade practices will be compared to 
those of traditional African trade partners. The section also provides an overview of the 
influx of manufactured goods in Nigeria, and the impact of counterfeits goods and how they 
have crippled the economy through the loss of billions worth of tax revenues. In addition, the 
emergence of Chinese economic migrants in African with a focus on Zambia and impacts are 
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assessed. The second section aims to explain factors hindering African economies from 
competing with Chinese manufactured imports. 
 
5.2 Overview of imported manufactured goods in Africa  
In the past 20 years, Chinese imports of their manufactured goods to Africa has grown in an 
alarming rate not only demonstrating to be detrimental to Africa’s industrial and economic 
transformation by crowding out some non-Chinese goods but also impacting negatively on 
Africa’s main traditional trade partners by dominating African markets.  The U.S, in 
particular, has been the main trade partner in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, whereas 
the E.U trades with North African countries. China has managed to penetrate various markets 
across Africa through the sales of their low-cost price manufactured goods (Giovannetti & 
Sanfilippo, 2016: 12).   
 
The Asian giant has become known for their capacity to supply low-cost manufactured goods 
in labour-intensive sectors. Most significant products include machinery and equipment, 
textiles and clothing industry, wood products, iron and steel, low-tech and relatively 
sophisticated productions. Various manufacturing sectors decreased as a result of China’s rise 
in the export of their manufactured goods, including those that rely on the production of low-
tech labour-intensive products. Therefore, China thus has a direct impact on local markets by 
displacing local producers, such as the displacement of clothing and accessories industries in 
Zambia. In fact, SSA countries domestic markets have declined since China’s strong 
competition, most particularly small and medium enterprises in the clothing, footwear and 
textile industry (Giovannetti & Sanfilippo, 2016: 12).   
 
Ward (2017) reported on a story highlighting that the E.U’s aggressive imports of poultry in 
Africa, specifically in Senegal, Cameroon, Ghana and most recently South Africa has been 
negative on these economies. He has found that the E.U has long-standing abusive 
agricultural trade practices by using its economic partnership agreements to import their 
highly subsidised agricultural products. Poultry farmers and producers make their profits 
63 
 
from the highly demanded chicken breast (white meat), which is considered to be healthy. 
The rest of the chicken meat; the bone-in such as thighs, wings, feet are classified as waste/or 
surplus which is not popular amongst European consumers but to African consumers and 
therefore is heavily imported to these countries.  Ward (2017) claims the effect has led to the 
shut down of 70% of broilers operation in Senegal, 120 000 job loses in Cameron, a reduction 
of poultry processing plants reduced to 25% capacity, feeding mills reduced to 42% capacity 
in Ghana whilst the South African poultry market has declined rapidly. As the European 
poultry farmers and producers are essentially dumping their surplus poultry in these 
developing countries. My observation is that this practice seems to be a trend by developed 
countries to use developing countries as a dumping ground for their manufactured goods. 
Therefore dumping is not a unique phenomenon brought by Chinese business practices. 
China’s trade patterns in this regard mirror similar practices as the E.U and others traditional 
African trade partners. 
 
As mentioned previously, dumping in international trade is not a new phenomenon. In fact, 
various countries expressed the need to impose “contingent protection” in order to balance 
their liberalisation commitments under certain circumstances. The introduction of (1) 
safeguards measures to respond to the serious injury to domestic market (2) anti-dumping 
duties, and (3) countervailing duties in response to subsidies become the three types of 
measures to fall under the contingent protection under the WTO. However, economists argue 
that free trade involves competition which may lead other or similar businesses to decline or 
cause them to close down as an unintentional consequence of business. Governments have 
found that some domestic industries suffer due to the influx of imports, therefore, these 
measures are viewed as necessary to balance “unfair trade”(Trachtman, 2013: 628). 
 
As explained by Trachtman (2013:631) the concept of dumping is known as selling your 
goods in a foreign market at a price below the production cost and lower than the home 
market or if such a price does not exist at all – this further understood as the international 
price discrimination. Dumping is also considered when it causes serious injury to material in 
that foreign market producing the same goods. It also often happens in private sector 
activities. Should that foreign market accuse the importing company of dumping, an 
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investigation into price discrimination will go ahead as well as an investigation into the cause 
of serious injury to the material, following confirmed findings of dumping, anti-dumping 
duties will then be applied. Furthermore, antidumping measures are used in order to prevent 
the formation and durability of monopoly capital which will result in the reduction of wealth 
on that foreign markets importing those goods (Trachtman, 2013: 640). 
 
The rationale behind dumping in the past was motivated by the fact that domestic market 
prices were no longer competitive due to their monopoly. They will then extend their reach to 
foreign markets. For that reason, goods sold below domestic prices will be justified as normal 
business practices as consumers in those foreign markets will benefit from low-cost goods. 
That is the reason why the economic definition of dumping does not exist as they see 
dumping as not a discrete economic phenomenon. The other argument against dumping arises 
from the issues of subsidies. Generally, under the WTO, subsidies alone is not illegal, 
however, export subsidies and import substitution subsidies are illegal and should be 
removed when they cause serious injury to material on the foreign market. Subsidies can be 
used to protect domestic markets from an influx of goods imported in that country, however, 
producers for instance in the E.U who are subsidised for the production of their products will 
have a negative impact on foreign producers in that similar industry. Determinations of what 
constitutes a serious injury to material in domestic markets are still widely contested and have 
caused debates between economists and political economy analysts (Trachtman, 2013: 642 - 
645). 
 
Developing countries make up the largest number of complaints against Chinese trade 
practices (Jiang, 2008: 58). Recently, U.S has launched anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
cases against China’s aluminium producers (LaRocco, 2017). Reviewing the literature on 
trade pattern by Eastern and Western countries, my analysis is that China becomes the focus 
in African trade relations due to their increased investment and they are subjected to criticism 
based on their business practices. Strong evidence shows that China is taking advantage of 
trade relations and cases of imbalance in trade figures, Chinese trading patterns have not been 
different to those of Western ones. Moreover, Tull (2006: 472) explains that through these 
trade exchanges, it cannot be justified to say that China will make a significant impact to 
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fundamentally alter Africa’s asymmetrical integration in the international market or reduce 
their dependency on export revenues or low-cost manufactured goods. China does not have 
altruistic motives when it comes to their foreign trade policies, instead, they engage in 
beneficial relations, which see them as seeking viable deals in order to expand their own 
economic goals. Tull (2006: 472) states China’s motives are driven by investments, markets, 
and a labour-intensive and export-oriented manufacturing sectors such as textile and clothing. 
 
The influx of Chinese manufactured goods in Nigeria  
In earlier years, Chinese manufactured goods were sold only in “China Town” in Lagos, but 
over time, Chinese products become accessible throughout the country in various markets in 
spite of the Nigerian governments’ campaign for “Made in Nigeria” goods. This was 
complemented by Chinese restaurants also becoming more popular in the country. The 
commercial success of Chinese entrepreneurs in Nigeria has been phenomenal considering 
the large population as a viable market and their attractive prices for locals. Thus, Chinese 
brands like Ferjeng and Jincheng would be cheaper than second-hand Japanese brands such 
as Yamaha or Suzuki. Chinese growing prominence in Nigeria is demonstrated by the fact 
that some Nigerian traders are also selling Chinese products because of their popularity 
(Ikhuoria, 2010: 131 - 132). 
 
Even though locals generate an income through the sales of Chinese manufactured goods by 
locals traders, I argue that this practice won’t yield a positive outcome in the long term. The 
influx of Chinese goods in Nigerian markets is a result of weak institution inability to protect 
jobs or create them, therefore, there will be limited growth as an entrepreneur. For instance, if 
a local trader sells the same products offered in the next shop (in this case, chain of shops full 
of Chinese goods) for the same price means a local trader will have little to no profits as well 
as no competition. The ends do not justify the means in terms of them generating wealth, but 
rather, they are surviving a harsh economic reality. Chinese traders have chains of shops and 
their businesses often expand as a result of providing a wide range of products for their 
consumers while generating great returns, unlike local traders who sell a few Chinese 
products. Fundamentally, local traders resort to selling Chinese goods as a reaction to their 
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situation rather than a choice – with local producers out of businesses. Ikhuoria (2010: 133) 
points out that it is as a result of the liberal trade regime that China is exploiting. The 
hypothesis is that more people will remain in poverty instead of breaking the cycle of being 
in poverty or creating deeper levels of poverty. 
 
High levels of Chinese manufactured goods in Nigeria, specifically Chinese textile resulted in 
the shrinkage of local business unable to compete. Chinese producers in China have better 
infrastructures to meet the high demand of supplying millions of people in one country alone 
in a short space of time. Unlike in Nigeria were infrastructures is a major problem and with 
constant electricity outages, it is virtually impossible for local producers to keep up and offer 
similar deals as the Chinese. Consequently, 65 Nigerian textile mills closed down and 
150,000 textile workers lost their jobs in the last decade. In 2008, it was reported that more 
than US$50 billion worth of Chinese goods were imported into African markets (Brautigam, 
2009: 231).  
 
Counterfeit Goods  
Imported manufactured goods coming into Nigeria are meant to be inspected and 
administrated by various institutions. For example, the Ministry of Commerce is responsible 
for trade policies and trade administration. In addition, administration of imports is the 
responsibility of the Nigerian Customs Services, whereas the National Agency for Food and 
Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) are responsible for the safety and control of 
those products on the health and wellbeing of the Nigerian nationals. Lastly, the inspection 
for quality and control of local and international manufactured goods are handled by the 
Standards Organisation of Nigeria. These institutions are meant to work in conjunction with 
each other in order to protect the Nigerian economy but often fail to detect counterfeit goods 
(Ikhuoria, 2010: 130). 
 
Africa’s lag in good institutions has created a serious problem concerning the emergence of 
counterfeit goods. A 2016 report by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
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Development (OECD) and the European Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) showed that 
counterfeit goods accounted for US$461 billion of the global trade compared to US$17.9 
trillion of total imports in world trade. In essence, 2.5% is the total figure of global exports 
made of counterfeit goods. Counterfeits goods are easily smuggled into the continent via 
various ways. African governments have been unsuccessful in eradicating counterfeit in their 
markets. It is estimated that close to 100,000 African die annually due to unknowingly 
consuming counterfeits medications. Poor people buy fake medication and other harmful 
products unknowingly as they look real. The World Health Organisation (WTO) predicts that 
African markets are flooded anywhere between 30 to 60% of fake medicine. Such as the 
Kenyan market is believed to have 80% of fake malaria medicine. Counterfeit goods that 
enter Africa go beyond damaging brand reputation and consumer confusion. Products range 
from the fake baby formula, cigarettes, medical instruments, vehicle parts, tyres, aircraft 
parts, motor oils and many more (Walter, 2017). 
 
Moreover, counterfeit goods result in an enormous loss in tax revenue; East Africa, for 
instance, lost US$500 million in tax revenue every year. This evidence suggests that the trade 
of counterfeit goods flourish in the informal environment than in controlled and regulated 
environments (Walter: 2017). Lin (2011: 2) correlates the latter with the fact that, counterfeit 
goods flow through open-air wholesale markets in densely populated areas because they are 
easy to transport and sold in an informal economy creating a so-called “grey zone” between 
formal and informal economy. As cited in Walter (2017), a 2011 study by Standard 
Organisation of Nigeria revealed that 85% of all goods sold in Nigeria were counterfeit and 
substandard.  
 
Walter (2017) asserts that the vast majority of counterfeits products come from the East - 
mainly from China. He confirms his argument by highlighting a report from the UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) that revealed 70% of all counterfeits goods seized globally 
during the period of 2008 to 2010 were manufactured in China. The decision toward China’s 
switch to becoming a more market-oriented economy gave a free rein to produce counterfeit 
goods, which have been under controversy and debate globally. Observers are particularly 
concerned about intellectual property rights, brand reputation and safety issues. The WTO 
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defines intellectual property as “rights given to people over the creation of their minds. 
Creators can be given the right to prevent others from using their inventions designs or other 
creations”. Furthermore, exploitation of any sort of the intellectual property rights without the 
acknowledgement and permission of the owner, constitute an infringement. Despite this, 
markets across the world are flooded by counterfeits, which are identical to genuine products 
(Lin, 2011: 4).   
 
Lin (2011: 6) explains that the production of counterfeits goods in China is about not only 
generating profits, or imitating Western brands and selling them at a cheaper price but it is 
also motivated by the desire to create a sense of shared cultural intimacy. She suggests that 
the copy culture has been a way for consumers to resist and reclaim control from the daily 
changes that come with an evolving global economy. The practice further demonstrates 
consumers’ ways of expressing themselves through various channels (particularly in China), 
by embracing innovation and a new wave of equality by not recognising the mainstream 
culture of consumption (Lin, 2011: 61). Manufactured goods shipped into African are of very 
low standard as mentioned earlier regarding fake medication. African consumers have 
expressed bitterness and frustration about the substandard quality of Chinese products 
flooding into their markets compared to those produced for Euro-American markets. Rupp 
(2008: 70) claims that China views African people as substantial, and undersupplied as a 
result, China took aggressive advantage by exporting their manufactured products but admits 
that it provide an agency of economy that was previously lacking. It is for that reason that 
critics have accused China of dumping their products in African markets.  
 
Counterfeit products make it to Africa through East African countries – with the main entry 
point in Tanzania and Kenya (Walter: 2017). Products are transported via cargo ships, air and 
increasingly through the internet. In order to avoid detection, counterfeit goods go to various 
ports from China to acquire formal documentation and invoices. In other instances, orders of 
goods are sent to Taiwan, but they are manufactured in China then transported to Taiwan then 
Africa (and various cities in the world) under false registrations and trademarks (Lin, 2011: 
35). In fact, smuggling of manufactured goods in Nigeria has become a norm and out of the 
control of the government. Even when the government tracks operations using smuggled 
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goods and shut them down, they often find a way to reopen the operation at the same place or 
somewhere else under a different name. An example is a Chinese market in Ikoyi, Nigeria in 
2003 (Ikhuoria, 2010: 135). 
 
Policing counterfeits goods is a challenge, not only in Africa but globally. It is impossible to 
regulate Chinese counterfeit goods because they are under “local protectionism”; whereby 
some local governments make the effort to protect local counterfeit operations, as they 
believe in their necessity within the economy and abroad (Lin, 2011: 48). I argue that this is 
another form of corruption and for some people in local governments to make profits and 
subsequently, developing countries will be hit the hardest. Walter (2017) states that there are 
currently sensible legal remedies for addressing counterfeiting in countries such as Nigeria 
and Zambia amongst other but unfortunately this enforcement is at a very small scale as these 
countries battle with the enormous amounts of counterfeit goods coming in their countries. 
 
The emergence of Chinese economic migrants in Africa: a focus on Zambia  
Due to the long-standing relationship, China has with many African countries; the number of 
Chinese nationals in African countries has increased throughout the past few decades. The 
majority are temporary migrants who are employed by Chinese SOEs and private Chinese 
companies. However, it is important to note that there is an increasingly larger number of 
independent migrants coming to the continent in the pursuit of economic opportunities (Park, 
2009: 2). It is common for Chinese nationals to leave the country in pursuit of economic 
opportunities, in fact, the coastal provinces of China, specifically Guangdong, Zhejiang, and 
Fujian are areas that for centuries sent out their nationals into the world. Young people are 
also put under social pressure to go abroad and return home successful. Although there are a 
number of migrants travelling to the U.S, Italy, Malaysia and France and more, the purpose 
of this paper is to focus on those who travel particularly into Africa. 
 
According to Park (2006: 3), there are various ways of how Chinese nationals arrive in 
Africa. Firstly, migrants arrive in Africa through the government-to-government 
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arrangement. These are particularly Chinese professional and labours such as doctors or 
agricultural advisors who are involved with development aid projects. Secondly, through a 
government licensed private employment agencies that tasked to recruit workers for 
government-run projects in oil fields, construction or mines. In addition, these agencies also 
assist with proper visa and travel documents. Thirdly, independent migrants travel to Africa 
through social networks, family or friends. Finally, those who are unable to use the above 
channels resort to getting into the continent through “snakeheads” or human 
traffickers/smugglers. Emmanuel Ma Mung as cited in Park (2009: 06) concludes that there 
are three types of Chinese migrants in Africa: firstly, temporary labour migrants who work 
for large Chinese companies involved in public building and large infrastructure; secondly, 
small-time entrepreneurs; thirdly, transit migrants. Furthermore, the Migration Policy 
Institute includes agricultural workers as a fourth category to the list. 
 
French (2014) asserts that Zambia has been the frontline of a large number of Chinese 
migrants. Chinese migrants began moving to the country as early as the 1990s, and with 
recent figures estimating over 100,000 Chinese nationals in the country. However, the 
Zambian government said the number was closer to 3,000 (Brautigam, 2009: 269). Despite 
the contradictory figures on the exact number of Chinese people in Zambia, evidence has 
shown the impact of the increased presence of Chinese traders has had on local traders 
(Leslie, 2016: 09).  
 
As mentioned earlier, small-time entrepreneurs or “new entrepreneurial migration” are 
another group of migrants in Africa. Many of these small-time entrepreneurs arrive in Africa 
to establish their businesses commonly in retail, wholesale trade of Chinese manufactured 
goods, although they were not necessarily entrepreneurs in China. Small-time entrepreneurs 
stock their products straight from China and sell them in their shops. This practice reduces 
the number of intermediaries, cut costs and guarantees bigger profits for the owners. These 
shops often stock almost everything that people need from toys, clothes, shoes, jewellery, 
hair extension, home appliances, garden tools, small electronics and more (Park, 2009: 7).  
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Zambian local traders have complained about the presence of Chinese traders in Lusaka who 
has taken up shop in the sprawling market of Kamwala – which is traditionally known as the 
city’s oldest trading place. Local traders have been displaced by the import of cheaply priced 
garments from China (African Business, 2008: 53). Rupp (2008: 68) has found that most 
anxieties, racism, and anger have been vigorously expressed due to the presence of Chinese 
nationals found in the marketplace. Furthermore, the establishment of Chinese shops 
encourages employment, as they will need more people to assist around the shop as the 
business expands, however, many times this is in favour of their relatives, friends, family or 
other Chinese national as preferred workers. Carling and Haugen as cited in Park (2009: 8) 
argues that Chinese nationals hire other Chinese nationals due to trust, arguing that it is easier 
to trust a family member or a friend. Transit migrants are another group of Chinese nationals 
who are most difficult to identify and document due to their informal status. It is believed that 
after 2008, 15, 000 Chinese farmers have settled in 50 agricultural villages (often remote and 
isolated) in 28 African countries; one of those countries is Zambia.  
 
5.3 Africa lacks manufacturing capacity 
Three factors are affecting the success of the manufacturing sector in Africa.  Firstly, 
structural factors that influence costs. The lack of infrastructure in Africa is the biggest 
challenge as it influences the level of production in manufacturing, the quality of institutions, 
the size of the domestic market and landlocked status. The Chinese government created 
Special Economic Zones in Africa to encourage manufacturing activities, which have resulted 
in favour for Chinese SOEs and private businesses to import their manufacturing goods in 
various countries (Jeannenry & Hua: 2015: 6). In contrast, African economies are battling to 
take advantage of the benefits of international division of labour through the integration into 
global production networks the same way China has been able to do over time (Yap & 
Henson, 2016: 6). 
 
I argue that if African countries had appropriate infrastructure as well as functioning 
institutions it will exert significant positive results on manufacturing sectors in Africa, 
perhaps to an extent of not manufacturing products in landlocked regions for local markets 
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but abroad significantly. The sale of African manufactured goods enables that particular 
country to diversify its economy and independently encourage entrepreneurs to integrate into 
the international marketplace. Currently, many African countries rely on traditional 
productions and do not have the capacity for large-scale production (Henson & Yap, 2016: 
11). 
 
Secondly, foreign competitors have negatively affected local economies. The greater volume 
and the more diversified the manufactured goods imported by foreign competitors in African 
countries, the greater the impact it has on various manufacturing sectors (Jeannenry & Hua: 
2015: 6). China’s ability to penetrate into African economies market through the export of 
various manufactured goods is detrimental. Even though China is not the only country that 
has secured an African market for their manufactured goods, competition amongst these 
various countries has exacerbated African industrial development. However, China has been 
the biggest culprit. Chinese manufactured goods to African countries were more than double 
the growth of export at 28% from the rest of the world at 12.9% from 2000 to 2013. 
Manufactured goods coming into Africa from China increased from US$4.4 billion in 2000 to 
US$86.7 billion in 20013. In essence, China’s negative impact on African manufacturing has 
directly resulted in a decrease of manufacturing added value of -1.12%  in African countries, 
which was higher than the effect other foreign countries have in Africa. This is in contrast to 
the rapid growth of China’s export of manufactured goods to Africa and profit generated 
(Jeannenry & Hua: 2015: 4 & 15). 
 
Thirdly, the relative price of manufactured goods, which is based on real exchange rates with 
different trade weights as per the competitors and markets. African counties who belong to 
certain custom unions such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the E.U 
benefit from quota and tariff-free access to their markets with the exception of arms. The 
negative impact of this often comes from the ambiguity of real exchange rates. In fact, this 
practice has negatively influenced labour remuneration, as local traders and foreign 
companies have to adjust prices and offer low-income wages to their workers. Studies have 
shown that workers who receive too low remuneration are at a higher chance of having their 
health and work capacity negatively affected (Jeanneney & Hua, 2015: 7).  
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China has traditionally relied on low-level labour remuneration as its main of competitiveness 
as well as intense productiveness. Giovannetti & Sanfilippo (2016:16) highlight a World 
Bank study on textile and clothing sector which shows AGOA member offers much lower 
labour remuneration as compared to in China. In essence, many African manufacturing 
exports lack the capacity to supply quality products, labour productivity, higher labour 
remuneration, comparative prices, and speed to market. For that reason, African producers 
are in no position to compete with Chinese companies, as they are unable to undercut Chinese 
productions costs as well as prices. Unquestionably, the imbalance of trade undermines job 
creation in Africa – as export to China is by large limited to capital-intensive commodities 
while Africa is creating jobs in China (Tull, 2006: 472). 
 
Giovannetti & Sanfilippo (2016: 35) state that in spite of the influx of Chinese manufacturing 
goods on the continent, the intra-African trade still continues but not at an impressive rate. 
They found that there is a correlation between China’s rising export to SSA countries and the 
reduction in both African export to SSA countries and in intra-SSA trade. This illustrates that 
the continual increase in Chinese manufactured goods in these countries came at an expense 
of intra-regional trade. They note that it is equally important to have intra-African trade 
agreements (such as ECOWAS) put in place in order to sustain trade grown in these regions. 
Furthermore, For them, Intra-regional trade is not considered to be the primary source of 
trade to other African countries and they explain this by highlighting that in 2006, only 8% of 
total export from Africa were directed in other African countries. They recognised that other 
factors such as the absence of regional production networks, varied barriers to trade, 
bureaucracy, lack of adequate internal infrastructure and increase in the cost of internal trade 
as hindering effects.  
 
Adebajo (2008: 19) suggests that Nigeria could be instrumental in reducing the dependency 
of Western and Eastern manufactured goods. However, another challenge in the equation is 
the informal trade within Western Africa since it has proven to outstrip formal trade and 
further exploit porous borders. In addition, the use of francophone currency zone tied to the 
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euro is also another element that hinders sustainable and successful regional integration 
within ECOWAS. That is the reason why, many ECOWAS countries remain poor, lack the 
infrastructure for industries, electricity and are dependent on customs duties to generate 
revenues. Due to the difficult growth in the economy, these countries find themselves 
competing instead of collectively working together towards change and progress. Meagher 
(2008: 168) also suggests that Nigeria could become a major player to provide a framework 
towards regional economic stability. Its successes will happen through economic capacity and 
organisational skills. 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrated that since China’s entry into the WTO, it has increased the supply 
of unprecedented amounts of manufactured goods worldwide, more especially affecting 
developing economies in Africa. Moreover, industries that produced textile, footwear, and 
leather, low-tech have been affected the most. Even though China is not the only country that 
has secured an African market for their manufactured goods competition amongst these 
various countries has exacerbated African industrial development. 
 
The first section explored international trade pattern, issues of dumping and contingent 
protection measures. Chinese trade practices were compared to those of traditional African 
trade partners and found that, although China is no different from traditional trade partners, 
they have the highest number of anti-dumping cases. The section also provided an overview 
of influx manufactured goods in Nigeria, and the impact of counterfeits goods and explained 
how they have crippled the economy through the loss of billions worth of tax revenues while 
causing the death of 100,000 Africans annually from unknowingly consuming the counterfeit 
medication. In addition, the emergence of Chinese economic migrants in Africa with a focus 
on Zambia was discussed. The section found that Zambians frequently complain of the 
presence of Chinese traders, often contributing to social unrest in the country. The third 
section explained various factors hindering African economies from competing with Chinese 
manufactured imports. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion  
African countries with rich resource profiles have attracted Chinese investment. Resource-
rich countries consist of resources which are scarce and economically useful for production 
and consumption. Moreover, non-renewable resources such as oil, gas, alluvial diamonds, the 
3Ts and gold are critical to the expansion of global economies. The second chapter 
highlighted how these natural resources created a geo-economical competition between 
different economic powers such as the E.U, U.S, and China which is often referred to as the 
“new scramble of Africa”. The narrative of “Africa Rising” highlights positive aspects of the 
continent such as investor confidence, growing economies, more democratic governments, 
growing use of cellphones, and the fast-growing middle class. In addition, these indicators are 
used to attract foreign investment to exploit oil and gas reserves while developing 
infrastructures such as railways from the resource points to the costs in order to transport 
these resources to the East and West. The consequence of this is that often revenues end up in 
the pockets of government officials, investors, shareholders while the wealth gap is rising at 
an alarming rate in many of these  African economies such as Nigeria and Zambia.  
 
Moreover, the chapter found that Chinese investment in resource-rich countries has 
undermined substantial growth for various reasons. Countries such as Ethiopia, Tanzania, 
Algeria, Zimbabwe, Angola and South Africa have benefited from infrastructure projects 
(schools, hospitals, airports, roads) capital inflow, political stature, human development, 
security assistance and a developmental partner. Similarly, Chinese investment assisted the 
rehabilitation of copper mines in Zambia and Nigeria’s railways. However, the Sino-African 
relations has heightened corruption, further weakened institutions, undermined the rule of 
law, made economies such as Nigeria and Zambia resource dependent and are therefore 
unable to diversify their economies, coupled with continuous trade imbalances. It is for that 
reason that they also experience a resource curse. Consequences of the curse have enriched 
governments, triggered violence, made authoritarian regimes more durable, and made 
governments less accountable to its population while undermining democracy. Often the 
implication of these relations includes lack of transparency, especially in the procurement of 
resource deals which has led to citizens to lose faith in their governments, especially 
concerning issues of social development and wealth distribution from resource revenues.   
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Under imperialism, economies were structured to produce raw materials and wealth for 
European powers. It was a policy about empires and the expansion of the European core by 
using rulers in the periphery to work for the core instead of their constituencies. Other key 
dimensions of imperialism included collusion between the state and MNCs, damage to the 
environment from resource extraction, horrific violence, labour disputes, and the import of 
manufactured goods to the periphery. Although China is not formally occupying African 
territories like previous imperialistic powers, Okoro et.al (2011: 95) affirms that China 
inhibits neo-imperialistic characteristics by "diplomacy friendship" and “new" rhetoric 
promises to exploit resources. 
 
In my research, I found that China’s ideology of wealth accumulation and expansion consists 
of neo-imperialist characteristic. There is strong evidence of Chinese companies colluding 
with states such as Nigeria and China, particularly in securing exclusive mining rights that 
often exclude the participation of local businesses. This has resulted in violent clashes in 
these mining areas of Zambia where Chinese companies are operating and in the Niger Delta 
region. Similarly, the Asian giant has secured a cheap supply of raw materials and a market 
for their manufactured goods in these countries. China also exercises some level of influence, 
mostly interested in economic global outreach. As a result, both Zambia and Nigeria do not 
have the diplomatic effectiveness but rather lags behind China's superior diplomatic 
knowledge and it is for that reason key implications of this would increase state capture to 
their advantage and will continue to feed China’s resource interests. 
 
The research also found that China employs the so-called “economic statecraft” of securing 
long-term supply and access to resources. As mentioned in previous chapters, Alves (2013: 
07) explained that economic statecraft is a strategy of a government influencing another 
government’s behaviour in their favour and this strategy can either be negative or positive. 
For instance, negative statecraft is using economic sanctions, and punishment to influence a 
government to adhere to particular demands. Whereas positive economic statecraft involves 
using a softer approach of extending economic incentives or rewards in order to influence a 
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government to comply with the lender's foreign policies. For example, China used 
concessional loans for the infrastructure as a foreign policy instrument (Alves, 2013: 08). 
 
In addition, Chinese allocation of investment correlates to market size, population, natural 
resources and often-political stability but negatively correlates with the rule of law. That is 
the reason why China establishes relations with rogue states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, 
who are resource-rich countries. The West often criticise China for their business practices as 
they argue they undermine the international standard of promoting democracy and economic 
liberalisation. In addition, The West fears that it will no longer have a dominant-influence on 
African matters, which also means less influence in securing a cheap supply of the resources. 
In addition, the West fears that the more influential and powerful China becomes, the more 
Western hegemony is threatened in Africa and ultimately in global affairs.  
 
When evaluating the scope of Chinese investments in chapter three and four, it is clear that 
the level of investments is more pronounced in the case of Zambia than Nigeria. China 
established various business ventures in various sectors with the majority in copper mining 
and manufacturing. China has also taken interest in joint ventured with both countries. This 
tells us that, joint ventures could have the potential to include local production companies to 
participate in the copper mining sector. However, Chinese investment is still dominant 
meaning they still have more advantage in being awarded resource deals. 
 
Another point is that Zambia and Nigeria have high levels of political patronage, strongly 
influenced by China’s political power. Chinese influence in the 2011 elections was evident 
when the late former president Michael Sata retracted his promises, to crack down on 
corruption and get rid of “bogus” Chinese businesses in the country shortly after his election 
victory. Their influence involves particular levels of state capture and political influence. 
China’s cosy relationship with former leaders such as Zambia’s Levy Mwanawasa, Frederick 
Chiluba, as well as Nigeria’s Sani Abacha, Goodluck Jonathan, Olusegun Obasanjo are 
examples of political patronage which has been persisting for a long time. An implication of 
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political patronage is that it strengthens corruption and most importantly political patronage is 
likely to continue, as mining deals will be awarded through this practice. This has a 
devastating effect on local companies who want to be part of the mining industry. 
Furthermore, revenue generated is not likely to be used for development and the interest of its 
population but rather government enrichments and a close circle of political elites. 
 
Unlike Zambia, the high levels of violence in Nigeria’s oil fields are horrific. Nigeria asked 
China for military assistance in order to protect their oil fields due to the inability to protect 
them from insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, MEND as well as to ensure the safety of 
Chinese nationals who have been targeted. This is also due to the resource curse; oil, in 
particular, has caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in the Niger Delta. 
However, Nigeria does not experience the same level of labour disputes as experience in 
Zambia. Chinese companies operating in copper mines are frequently been accused of the 
worst labour practices, despite the fact that mining conditions are generally bad globally. 
Violent clashes between Zambian mine workers and Chinese mine bosses have led to the 
deaths of local miners in the hands of their Chinese bosses. This is also due to the fact that 
Chinese mines turn to operate outside the rule of law and not held accountable.  
 
Chapter five found that Chinese manufactured goods imported to Zambia and Nigeria are 
detrimental to their potential industrial and economic transformation by crowding out some 
locally manufactured goods and most importantly straining intra-continental trade. Although 
the U.S and E.U produce the same effects, China is criticised more because they have the 
greatest number of anti-dumping cases globally, with the majority of complaints coming from 
African developing economies such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. There is 
strong evidence suggesting that China is taking advantage of trade relations and trade figures 
support this argument. Dumping is selling your goods in a foreign market at a price below the 
production cost or lower than the home market or if such a price does not exist at all. In 
essence, dumping is a form of price discrimination and often developing economies such as 
Nigeria and Zambia are unable to compete with these prices as well as other factors such as 
labour intensity it required. The biggest disadvantage hindering Africa’s manufacturing 
capacity is the lack of appropriate infrastructure and technology to handle large production, 
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hence locally manufactures turn to close down. Chinese manufactured goods include 
machinery and equipment, clothing, wood products, iron and steel, low-tech and relatively 
sophisticated productions. 
 
Much like Nigeria, Zambia has complained about the unprecedented influx of low-quality 
Chinese manufactured goods and poor quality infrastructure. Although locals benefit from 
low-cost products, local businesses have been negatively affected more especially in Zambia 
with the continuous increase of economic migrants. In contrast, entrepreneurs in Nigeria and 
Zambia expressed that penetrating the Chinese market is often difficult. In addition, 
counterfeits goods are responsible for East Africa losing US$500million in tax revenue 
annually, although this problem affects the entire continent. Moreover, 100,000 people die 
annually due to unknowingly consuming the counterfeit medication. According to Walter 
(2017), the majority of counterfeits goods come from the East, smuggled as a result of weak 
institutions meant to inspect and manage imports.  
 
The U.S, E.U, and more specifically China are global economic powers who continue to have 
a strong footprint in African developing economies and their keen interest in resource-rich 
countries have successfully secured oil and other natural resources. The implications tell us 
that Africa will not necessarily be integrated into the global economy, but rather its resources 
are the key in the economic expansion of these global powers, Therefore, many African 
countries like Zambia and Nigeria will not gain significant improvements towards sustainable 
economic growth and development toward their national interests and benefit for their 
populations.  
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